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Dr. Roberts has been closely associated with the Student Christian Movement on both sides of the Atlantic for many years. He is a contributor to the Contemporary Review, the Hibbert Journal, International Journal of Ethics and other periodicals, and the author of several volumes, among them "The Gospel at Corinth," "Florence Simms; a Biography," and "The New Man and the Divine Society."

THE CHRISTIAN GOD



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THE CHRISTIAN GOD

BY

RICHARD ROBERTS

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PREFACE

THIS little book contains the Merrick Lectures delivered at Ohio Wesleyan University, Delaware, Ohio, in December, 1928. I wish to express my thanks to the Trustees of the University for the honour they did me in inviting me to deliver the lectures, and to President Soper and Professor Rollin H. Walker for much counsel and kindness both before and during the delivery of the lectures.

The lectures are in some sort intended for a confession of faith; but obeying an apostolical injunction, I have tried to give a reason for the faith that is in me. The limitations which, from the nature of the case, the Merrick Lectures (in common with similar foundations) impose on the lecturer have prevented me from offering here much more than the skeleton of an argument; and, even then, the skeleton suffers much from the circumstance that it had to be put together amid the never-ending calls of a city ministry. But as the terms of the Merrick Lectureship require a reasonably early publication, the lectures have to appear in what I am well aware is a less satisfactory state than the occasion deserves.

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The lectures are semi-popular in character, for the very good reason that the public was invited to hear them. One of the very happy circumstances of the delivery of these lectures was the surprisingly large attendances. It was very encouraging to come upon so much keen public interest in serious theological discussion. Apart from a slight rearrangement of the material and some minor changes in the text, the lectures appear here as they were delivered. A few short sections of the text have appeared in print in various journals.

If these lectures possess any value, it is largely due to the stimulus and light that I have derived from many books, some of which are acknowledged in the notes at the end of the volume; but very especially also to many conversations with two friends, Professor John Macmurray, of University College, London, and President R. P. Bowles, D.D., of Victoria College, Toronto.

RICHARD ROBERTS

Toronto, January, 1929

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THE CHRISTIAN GOD

THE CHRISTIAN GOD

I

PRAYER AND REVELATION

1. The Fact of Prayer

I BEGIN by asking you to consider the spectacle of a man on his knees. That is the empirical fact from which the study of religion should start. It is not necessary at this point to assume anything about what the man is doing; I ask you only to observe that he is doing something, that he is behaving in a particular way. He may be only beating the air, crying for the moon, or otherwise acting vainly and foolishly. None the less he is doing something. His praying is a fact. Whether it is effectual is another story.

It is probably true that some time or another, in one way or another, most men pray; it is certain that many men pray much, and that everywhere in the world, under various forms, men may be found praying.

Further, men have been praying for a very long time. When we dig up the ruins of old, dead civilizations, we find that they had their places of prayer. Man seems

always to have been a praying animal; and that he is still praying after so long a time is a fact of very considerable importance. Prayer has evidently—to use the modern jargon—some survival value. If it had been wholly vain and fruitless behaviour, it could hardly have so long survived the racket of natural selection. Clearly, there must be something in it.

Besides, men are still praying in spite of the fact that it has often been shown to be an irrational and superstitious thing to do. We have been told time and again that there is no room for prayer in the kind of universe that this is. "Science" has discountenanced it, yet men still pray. Whatever it is, prayer seems to be an activity of quite remarkable toughness.

Here, then, we have a kind of human behaviour, which is universally distributed, seems to be as old as historical man, and which, if it is as vain as we have been told it is, should have disappeared from the world long ago. The presumption would appear to be that, whatever it is, it is very deeply ingrained in human nature.

Let us consider some actual cases of men praying.

(1) Something happened, you well remember, to Saul of Tarsus, as he was travelling from Jerusalem to Damascus on a heresy-hunting errand. Just what happened to him we need not now stay to discuss. But it was evidently something that turned his world upside down. His world had fallen to pieces; his hopes had

gone up in smoke. But we are told that he was praying. "Behold, he prayeth." What for? We do not know. To whom? That we cannot tell; but we may fairly surmise that it was not the God in whose service he had met this disaster. Between his shattered past and his dark future he was praying, as it were, for some unknown good to an unknown God, and probably "with no language but a cry."

When a man is lost in a wood, he does not wait to be sure there is some one there before he cries out. He cries out in order to discover if there is some one there. So in his distress man cries out; and sometimes, like Saul of Tarsus, when all resources have failed him, he cries out to discover if there be succour or friendship somewhere beyond his human neighbourhood. That kind of crying is prayer. It is a sending of an S.O.S. into the unknown.

(2) But even this, which looks like prayer reduced to its elements, is already prayer in an advanced stage of development. We may, however, find it in much more crude and rudimentary forms. Most anthropologists seem to agree that the cave drawings of Palaeolithic man originated in "sympathetic magic." [1] It does not matter what name we give to the origin of these drawings. What is meant is that when the caveman wanted more children, he drew pictures of children on the cave wall. When he wanted good hunting, he made drawings of deer. It is to be observed that in the

impulse which brought forth these mural drawings, there were two ingredients: there was, first, a desire for a better, i.e., a happier world, a world in this case conceived simply as a world of more people and more animals; and second, a dark sense of an unknown power that was capable of being favourably influenced towards man and was able to affect favourably the lot of man and to give him his heart's desire.

(3) I pass on now to the other end of the story. Lancelot Andrewes was a great man of prayer; and he left behind him a manuscript of his prayers. You may and, if you are wise, you will procure the volume of *The Private Prayers of Lancelot Andrewes.* Then, reading the book, you will discover that his prayers include

Comprecation
Penitence
Deprecation
Confession
Thanksgiving
Commemoration
Praise
Petition
Intercession
Commendation
Acts of Faith
Acts of Hope
Blessing
Doxology

This is prayer in a highly developed form. It is a far cry from Saul in Damascus; still farther from the cave-

man. Yet Lancelot Andrewes is at bottom doing what they were doing. He, too, is sending out signals into the unknown. The signalling practice has clearly been much elaborated; and we shall have presently to consider the meaning of this elaboration. But in essence, all these signals are aspects of a commerce with the unknown.

(4) On this point of elaboration, I want to add this: Father Poulain, a French Catholic, has been studying the prayers of the saints and has set down his conclusions in a work called *Des Grâces d'Oraison.*[2] He distinguishes four kinds of "ordinary prayer":

> Vocal prayer
> Meditation or Methodical prayer
> Affective prayer
> The Prayer of Simple Regard

He makes other distinctions as well; but these will serve us just here. With the content of the distinctions that Poulain makes I am not now concerned. I only note that he makes these distinctions. The distinctions that Lancelot Andrewes makes are distinctions in the *substance* of prayer. Those that Poulain makes are distinctions in the *form* of prayer. Once more, we observe how the signalling practice has been elaborated; and I need only refer to the great Liturgies to remind you of another aspect of this elaboration.

I have set down these four instances of the practice of prayer just as they came to my mind. The list might

be indefinitely extended. There has been an endless variety of forms—gestures, rites, sacrifices, ceremonies, songs, silences and speech—under which men have prayed and still pray. But whatever the form and through all variety of content, the essence of prayer is that it is an approach to the unknown.[8]

We observe then, that prayer is to be found wherever man is found, that it has persisted through his known history, that it is practised in many forms and that it has proved capable of much refinement and elaboration. It is, therefore, not unreasonable to infer that it is connected with some original necessity of human nature. It has every right to be regarded—in a broad sense—as a biological phenomenon which must be accounted for. The impulse that expresses itself in prayer seems to be organic to man; and its ultimate roots may be presumed to lie in the very stuff of life, whatever that may be.

2. Life and the Unknown

Prayer, as we have seen, is human activity directed towards the unknown. But it may be urged with some reason that activity directed towards the unknown is a characteristic of all life; and that, of that activity, evolution is the outcome. Our scientific men when they survey the process of life as a whole, find themselves unable to avoid the use of words like "experiment," "risk," "adventure." In this connection, these words

may be anthropomorphisms. It is, to be sure, only to a limited extent that we can read into them the content of motive and purpose which they have when we apply them to ourselves. They do, however, hint at an analogy between certain phenomena on the human and sub-human planes. Analogy is not, of course, proof of organic connection. Yet frequency of analogy does justify us in presuming a common tendency within the field under observation. In any case, that ingredient in human nature which impels it to take risks and to make experiments must, even on a naturalistic view, have an ancestry which goes back to the first biococcus.

Now, the presence in the process of life of what seems to be experiment and risk suggest an "animal faith" in the existence of a possible—that is to say, a hitherto undiscovered, perhaps yet to be created—world. This faith may have been unconscious; but without it, no experiment could have been made, no risk taken. But experiments were made and risks were taken; and the results became the starting points of new experiments and new risks. There were failures in the process; yet the process as a whole prospered; faith in the unknown possible world was justified. The odyssey of life from its first beginnings up to man has been a continuous experimental thrust into the unknown.

Rupert Brooke, in a poem in which he meant to satirise the religious aspirations of man, reports the aspirations of fish:

> Fish say, they have their Stream and Pond,
> But is there anything beyond?
> This life cannot be all, they swear. . . .

Unfortunately for the satire, it seems that once upon a time a fish did act upon the faith that there was something "beyond," ventured on to dry land and became the ancestor of land animals. The Eustachian tube and the thymus gland in man appear to be the vestiges of the gill-clefts of a fish.[4] The fish did have a beyond and pushed out into it. That adventurous fish is a parable of all evolving life.

The logic of evolution forbids us from assuming that the evolution of life has reached its term in man. It may be that on the physical side there is little likelihood of any major modifications in the structure of man; in which case, his further evolution must be chiefly in the region of the spirit. If the evolutionary movement is still at work in man, we should expect him to show signs of that thrust into the unknown which seems to have been present in life at all its previous stages. I venture to suggest that that thrust survives in man in the behaviour which we call prayer.

But clearly this calls for more examination. For one thing, there is an ingredient in prayer which we cannot trace in the general biological thrust. For another, the thrust continues elsewhere than in prayer. Our caveman may help us at this point. Accepting the view that the cave drawings were the outcome of sympathetic

magic, we traced two elements in the motive that produced them. The one was the hope and the desire for a possible world conceived simply as a world of known and desirable goods (children, edible or otherwise useful animals). The other was a dim sense of a mysterious power which could somehow be influenced favourably towards the realisation of this desired world. But it is necessary to add that there was a third ingredient in the impulse, namely, the germ of what was eventually to develop into art, and which evoked an aspiration towards another kind of possible world, a world of beauty. The first tradition of cave-art declined and died, it is true. But the impulse that produced it lived on and in due time reëmerged. We cannot trace the course of development. But it is clear that at last the possible world was conceived under the three broad aspects of the good, the true, the beautiful. Correspondingly there grew a specialised effort to bring to being the possible world thus contemplated. The effort to create the possible world of Truth became Science and Philosophy. The effort to create the possible world of Beauty grew into Art. The effort to create the possible world of Goodness developed into a preoccupation with the problem and practice of right behaviour. But this possible world is a world conceived as realisable within the bounds of and with the materials available in time and space. Its setting is in this world in what we call the future.

But the sense of the unknown power and of its accessibility to human approach also brought forth a specialised activity, namely, prayer. The specific distinction of prayer is that the object to which it is directed transcends time and space. Goodness, truth and beauty are conceived as attainable within our world. They are the ends of the historical adventure of man. But prayer is the human adventure as it is directed towards —well, let us for the moment call it *x*. There is an unknown which we may simply call the human future, the house of life which man is aspiring to build in time and space. But man has achieved the sense of another unknown, the unknown-eternal; and it is to this unknown-eternal that prayer is directed.

This, then, is the ingredient in prayer which differentiates it from the general thrust of life towards the unknown—the sense of an unknown-eternal which is, in some way, living and accessible to man, capable of understanding and granting the desire of man, and which as time went on was felt to be worth seeking for itself. Perhaps Professor Lloyd Morgan's convenient term "emergent" comes in appositely here. We may apply it to prayer in the same sense as he applies it to cognition or reason. Perhaps, indeed, we may not unreasonably identify the emergence of prayer with the emergence of "spirit," as the latter appears in Lloyd Morgan's scheme of emergent levels.

3. Religion and the Ultimate Values

It is necessary to dwell a little longer upon the relation of religion to the ultimate values.

No doubt, at first and for a long time, the unknown-eternal, dimly apprehended, was chiefly thought of as influencing and as itself capable of being favourably influenced towards the provision of desired goods in the here-and-now. This view indeed still persists. The notion of a God, whose chief business is to forward our designs and to pull our chesnuts out of the fire, is still strong in popular religion. But religion took a step forward when the unknown-eternal came to be thought of not merely as chiefly affecting possibilities in this world, but as somehow having to do with the ultimate destiny of man, whatever that might be. A new feeling about the unknown-eternal emerged; a right relation to it came to be regarded as a matter of life and death. The unknown-eternal hidden from human sight and touch at once fascinated and repelled, attracted and terrified. It acquired the quality which Dr. Otto called the "numinous" and evoked the sense of the "holy." It came to be regarded as having absolute worth.

Dr. Oman distinguishes two stages in the sense of the "holy." [5] The first is the "awesome-holy"; the second, the "ethical-holy." The second stage emerged when man saw that he stood in the presence of "a reality

before which he may not seek his own pleasure or walk after the imagination of his own heart." This was a moment of great importance in the human effort to assign a value to *x*.

But observe what has happened. The unknown-eternal is now conceived as good. In the sense of the "ethical-holy," ethics and religion meet. Nevertheless the broad distinction between religion and ethics must be maintained.

There are two broad types of moral behaviour, which, though in effect they may have outward similarity, spring from opposite sources. The one is the conduct which is dictated by an ethical tradition, *sittlichkeit,* as well as law. Certain modes of conduct have proved to be useful, others to be injurious—useful and injurious here having primary reference to the survival and well-being of the individual and the group. The first are approved; the others condemned. The approved modes become the mores to which the members of the group are expected to conform.

But, as Dr. Oman says, an ethic of this kind is "business, not morality." It is an affair of the "higher expediencies."

The other mode of conduct is that which is evoked by the perception and the acceptance of "goodness" as an ultimate value. Here goodness is done not because it pays, but because it is good. An act of courage or self-sacrifice is its own justification, even though it fail

of its immediate object. It has an absolute worth. It is difficult to distinguish between the motive of such behaviour and the characteristic religious attitude.

The same thing may be said of science and art. Truth and beauty are ends in themselves: and they provoke attitudes of mind which have a family likeness to those of religion. Both science and art at their best have their own pieties, both call for and receive from their practitioners a devotion not unlike that of the saints. The pursuit of both is accompanied by inward satisfactions reasonably comparable with those that are characteristic of the life of prayer. Moreover it is a commonplace that, especially in art, some of the greatest achievements have had a confessedly religious motive. This is the connection which explains William Blake's inscriptions on his engraving of the Laocoon: "A Poet, a Painter, a Musician, an Architect, the man or woman who is not one of these is not a Christian"; "Prayer is the Study of Art; Praise is the Practice of Art."

Just as it is impossible to draw sharp lines of distinction between the various faculties and powers of man, so it is vain to attempt to draw a too fine distinction between the elements and aspects of human aspiration. A devotion to goodness, truth and beauty is to be accounted a religious thing; yet it must be insisted that they are by no means the whole of religion. For the chief concern of religion is with the unknown-eternal,

or if you care to put it so, with the supernatural. Indeed this word "supernatural" directly suggests the distinction which I am trying to make. We do not think of goodness, truth and beauty as supernatural. We do not find the difficulty in believing in their existence that we find in believing in a supernatural object. We are able to recognise their presence in events and objects in the present; they do actually belong to our world. But it is possible to have a religious devotion to them along with a definite indifference to or even a deliberate denial of the supernatural. But the final business of religion is with the supernatural, the unknown-eternal.

But it is difficult to be satisfied with this as a final disposition of the matter. We have seen that the worth of goodness, truth and beauty is in itself underived from specific mundane sources. They are seen to be present in temporal objects and events, yet we cannot say that they themselves are temporal. They have a quality which is supra-temporal, that is, eternal; intrinsically, they are independent of time and space. We are therefore entitled to regard them as elements or attributes of the unknown-eternal, and to explain their presence in objects and events in time by supposing that the unknown-eternal projects itself into the here-and-now. In that case, the ultimate values constitute what in religious discourse constitutes a revelation. They tell us something of the character of the unknown-eternal.

It is the utterly good, the utterly true, the utterly beautiful.

This somewhat anticipates the argument. Here our main business is to distinguish between a devotion to the ultimate values and the specific religious impulse which expresses itself in prayer. We acknowledge a genuinely religious spirit in the feeling for and the quest of goodness, truth and beauty. But religion seeks a farther goal, of which goodness, truth and beauty may be, and on our view, probably are the reflection in our world. I have called this goal the unknown-eternal or *x;* but it does not matter much what we call it. We are thinking of it now only as the object to which prayer is directed.

4. Revelation

Prayer is a kind of behaviour; and we have those among us today who bid us believe that all behaviour is a response to an external stimulus. It is undoubtedly true that a good deal of human behaviour is to be explained in that way. But I find it excessive to deny the possibility of deliberate and purposive behaviour on the part of the organism, especially when the organism is the human person. In view of our present quite final inability to know everything that goes on within an organism, it is surely an unscientific mind that affirms that all behaviour is a response to stimulus from without. But when you come upon the kind of behaviour

that prayer is, a behaviour that is universal and persistent wherever man is, I think that you have no alternative but to admit that it is or that it at least originated in a response to a stimulus, and then to add that the stimulus like the response is itself universal and persistent.

In the main, it appears that the development of human faculty has been provoked by some excitation caused by stimuli which have their origin in the environment. The eye was clearly fashioned out of the organism itself; but quite as clearly it was not the unaided invention of the organism. It grew out of the effort of the organism to respond to the stimulus of light. Here was the blind organism, and light was falling on it, irritating it; and it began to attempt to grasp the cause of the irritation. Out of that attempt, at long last, came the eye. It was the result of a coöperation between the organism and a specific element (i.e. light) in its environment. That the achievement was involuntary and unconscious may be true; though there is no way of verifying this. What is pertinent to our argument is the collaboration of the organism and the environment in the evolution of the eye.

Yet the organism could not have been in any way aware of the character of the world of light which was thus impinging upon it. It could become aware of it only as it progressively fashioned the instrument by which it could perceive it. In response to some constant

but unapprehended stimulus from its environment, it was stirred to the effort to fashion out of its own being a faculty by which it could apprehend the source of the stimulus. What is true of the eye must (*mutatis mutandis*) be true of all the fixed responses and adaptations of the organism to its environment.

We cannot exclude prayer from the operation of this principle. Why should we? Prayer is as authentic a type of human behaviour as thinking; and it must have come about in much the same way. That there are people who feel no need of prayer and have no experience of the impulse to pray does not invalidate this view of it. There are men born blind and men who have lost their sight; but that does not mean that there are no such things as sight and light. I suggest that the man who is never aware of the impulse to pray is, either through some accident of nature or more probably through his own negligence, as biologically defective as, say, a deaf man. It may perhaps be answered that religious insensibility and deafness are not on the same plane; we do not know the source and the object of prayer as we know the source and object of other human urges and responses. We can see the correspondence between sight and light, between hunger and food; but the term corresponding to the prayer-relation we have no knowledge of. This however is not a valid objection. If the physicist says that the behaviour of certain elements of the physical universe

leads him to believe in the existence of a mysterious something, possessing properties quite inconceivable to us, which he calls the *æther;* if the psychologist argues that certain kinds of human behaviour compel him to believe in the existence in man of a mysterious something, having certain properties, which he calls the *unconscious,* why may not I say that a certain mode of human behaviour, as well authenticated as any other mode, compels me to believe in the existence of an invisible being which possesses certain properties? At least, I can claim that this explanation of prayer is *prima facie* more scientific in spirit than the strained speculations by which some radical psychologists explain prayer away.

There is an environment hidden from our five or so inadequate little senses, which stimulates us; and our response is prayer. This environment is what we have called the unknown-eternal, which now assumes a new character. The unknown-eternal has so far figured as the object and goal of prayer; now it appears as the stimulant of our prayer. It is no longer a static objective; we now recognise it as an activity of which in some sort we are the objects, and to which we respond. In its beginnings, the response was blind and fumbling; but we have seen how with the passing of time it has grown in refinement, in elaboration, and in assurance. It probably is true that even yet we are to regard prayer

as being very much in its infancy. I hazard the view that prayer is the effort of the human organism to evolve a spiritual eye, a faculty which should in due course enable it to apprehend the unknown-eternal, to see *x*. This is a rough and ready way of putting it, but the point should be evident. Prayer is the human effort to see the invisible, "the light that never was on land or sea"; and it is that same light that has set the effort afoot.

This does not at all mean that the human spirit has not begun in a dim way to see the light. At this point, the actual evolution of prayer assumes importance. At one end is the gesture of sympathetic magic which the caveman made; at the other end, Lancelot Andrewes' *Preces Privatae* and the great Liturgies. In its later developments, prayer has become activity of a very elaborate kind. But this in its turn must be traced to the increasing sensitiveness of the organism to the character of the unknown-eternal to which prayer is directed. Take Lancelot Andrewes' Praise, Penitence, Thanksgiving and the rest of his categories. What are these but specialised responses stimulated by corresponding elements in the character of the unknown-eternal as they have been perceived in the experience of the saints through the praying ages? What is Thanksgiving but the specialised response to the discovery that God is the source of all our good? What is Penitence

but the specialised response to the discovery that God is holy and that we are not? What is Confession but the specialised response to the discovery that God is true and that He requires us to stand on a footing of sincerity and candour before Him? With the actual content of this growing apprehension of the unknown-eternal, we need not now concern ourselves further. Other instances of what I have in mind are the advance already spoken of from the sense of the awesome-holy to that of the ethical-holy, and the now familiar story of the clarification and refinement of the Hebrew conception of God.

Now this growing perception of the character of *x* corresponds to what in religious speech is called "revelation." On the side of the organism, it is discovery; on the side of *x*, it is self-manifestation. From *x* comes a stimulus which evokes the response of prayer. The act of prayer in turn produces a greater sensitiveness and receptivity to the impact of *x*. Out of this continued commerce there slowly comes to the organism a dawning recognition of the character of *x*. To use the phraseology with which Dr. A. N. Whitehead has made us familiar, the act of prayer provides the occasion for the ingression of *x* into a human life; this ingression constitutes a new event; and this event becomes a revelation. And it is so, here a little, there a little, line upon line, precept upon precept, that the body of revelation has grown.

My old friend and chief, John Pugh of Cardiff, himself a great evangelist, was one day telling me how I should deal with "seekers." "My boy," he said, "when you see them on the brink, get them to their knees." Since then I have learned from some experience that this was sound counsel. To the doubtful and hesitating soul, when it is persuaded to prayer, something decisive does frequently come. All such moments are of the nature of a revelation. They tell us something of the Ultimate Reality with which we have to do. The moment may be, to the individual, discovery, illumination, conviction, conversion, inspiration; but its substance is the ingression of the unknown-eternal into his life. It is by such ingressions that the unknown-eternal makes itself most surely known.

Religion we may therefore describe as an activity in which there is a continuous and progressive mutual evocation of revelation and prayer.

There are one or two matters pertinent to this discussion which I wish to summarise briefly.

First: I have spoken of the impulse of prayer, of prayer as a response to a stimulus. But plainly this cannot stand as the whole truth of the matter. It is necessary to add that though prayer originates in a response to a stimulus, it may become a voluntary practice. The impulse to pray may develop into the will to pray. A man may and does come to pray of his own choice and motion.

Second: There is perhaps some need to say that the argument in this lecture is not offered as *proof*. My intention is a rather more modest one. What I have tried to do is to show that there are grounds for believing that prayer and revelation are not out of analogy with processes which seem to be general in nature, and that therefore prayer and revelation and the relation between them may be regarded as sufficiently established to be regarded as a basis for action. We have here, I believe, a presumption of truth; and this truth like all truth can only be reached by acting upon the presumption. The action in this case is prayer. Antecedently, no argument in this region can go beyond a presumption. Conviction of truth is the result of an experiment.

But it has to be admitted that in this region the proof that a man will find is an inner experience which is only partly capable of analysis and is therefore not finally stateable to another man. There is an element in it that "breaks through language and escapes." It is not even possible to prove that this element is not an illusion, though its consequences in the life of the person who possesses it, and the circumstance that a multitude which no man can number have testified to their possession of it, go far to establish it as a fact. There are still limitations upon our minds that prevent us from a complete analysis and statement of our

æsthetic experiences; but that is not urged as a demonstration of the illusory character of such experiences or of their objects. Why then should it be intellectual sin to trust our religious experiences?

II

THE CHRISTIAN EVENT

WHAT I was aiming at in the first chapter was to show that there are grounds for believing it possible to acquire knowledge of the character of God, or if you care to put it so, that a belief in revelation is reasonable. Under more spacious circumstances, it would be my duty to trace the development of the reciprocal movements of aspiration and revelation in the history of religion. The time at our disposal allows us no such ambitious enterprise; and we shall have to take a long jump. I propose to speak today of the Christian event; and I shall try to show you what I conceive that to be. But please understand that I do not omit even a brief study of the antecedents of the Christian event because I think them unimportant. The central stream of the more immediate antecedents of Christianity, the passage by which men's spiritual insight grew, so that Jahwe became transformed in their minds from a minor local deity into the one God of all the earth, is one of the greatest and most moving episodes in the history of our race; and no complete understanding of Christianity is possible without a

study of it. But there was in the Christian event an ingredient which was not present at any earlier stage; and it is precisely that which concerns us in these lectures.

1. Jesus our Contemporary

Christianity started in an event. It rests not on a doctrine but on a memory. It begins not with a body of principles but with a body of facts. Its primary Scriptures,—the Synoptic Gospels—are not an exposition, but a chronicle.

Doctrines, opinions, beliefs have no elements of permanency. Fashions in thought vary as do all other fashions. Growing knowledge and enlarging experience compel us from time to time to abandon or to modify ideas that once seemed as firm as the everlasting mountains. All living thought is always and of necessity in a state of flux. In a world like this, what "was good enough for mother" is not necessarily good enough for me.

But facts do not change. What is done is done; and it can neither be undone or done over again. Events happen only once; having happened, so they remain. They are fixed and immutable. The battle of Waterloo was fought in 1815; that fact, that event happened; and it can neither be denied nor changed. You may doubt whether it would have ended as it did but for Blucher's arrival in the nick of time; you may argue

without end about the political significance of the event. But nothing alters the fact that there was a battle at Waterloo in 1815. In the same way the body of facts, with which and from which Christianity took its origin, remains. It is true that we do not know all the facts; and some of the known facts are questioned. But Christianity professes itself to rest upon the facts of the life and death of Jesus. The Christian event is Jesus Christ in life and death.

But, you may ask, does not that condemn Christianity to stagnation? What is the good of "Jesus Christ, the same yesterday, today, and for ever," in a changing world? How can a faith which makes its continued appeal to old and remote events have any pertinence to the life of today? Jesus lived and died in a world wholly unlike ours. It was a rather simple and elementary society compared to our complex, sophisticated, machine-driven civilisation. Jesus' world was a world without science, without newspapers, without automobiles. How then can He have any significance for a world like this that we live in? This is a world of process, even if not of progress. Everything is on the move; how can a faith that springs from a nineteen-century-old event escape being outmoded and impertinent at this time of day?

Upon this matter, two things may be said. First, because the individual life is so short, a space of nineteen hundred years seems a very long time. But may

we not be looking at it through the wrong end of the telescope? Suppose we look at it from the other end. How long *homo sapiens* has been on the face of the earth we do not actually know. The first man of the modern type came from Africa and established himself in France about 11,000 years B.C., but he must have emerged a considerable time before that. Let us estimate B.C. 12,000 as the approximate date of his emergence. Then the time between us and Jesus is at best only one-sixth or one-seventh of the total time that man has been on the earth. From that end of the telescope Jesus seems considerably nearer to us; he is almost our contemporary. In this longer perspective, what we have called ancient history is relatively modern; and Plato and Moses are comparatively recent persons. It does not do to make too much of measurements of time.

Second, and more significant: the present importance of an event in past history does not depend upon its date. For instance, the signing of Magna Carta took place six hundred years before the battle of Waterloo. But the signing of Magna Carta is far more significant to us today than the defeat of Napoleon. The present importance of any historical happening depends not on its antiquity or its recency, but upon that elusive thing we call *value*. The signing of Magna Carta is important today because it is one of the major landmarks in the development of human freedom. It was an

event which affirmed an essential "value" and secured its recognition in political government. If I were to ask you to name a battle in Greek history, and if you only knew of one, I think I know which it would be. It would be Thermopylæ. There were greater battles in Greek history than Thermopylæ. But Thermopylæ has lived in men's memories, because it was a magnificent demonstration of courage and loyalty; it was a sublime affirmation, at the cost of utter sacrifice, of things that have abiding and universal value for the proper growth of mankind. Magna Carta and Thermopylæ are not names in a history book. They are the permanent possessions of mankind. It is in this region that we are to look for the explanation of the fact that, in spite of nineteen centuries, Jesus is still our contemporary.

2. The Early Ministry of Jesus

Of Jesus we know surprisingly little considering how large a place He came to fill in human life. In the written accounts of His life we have possibly no records of more than forty separate days, in a public ministry which lasted at the very least four hundred days.[1] Of His brief public life nine-tenths is left unchronicled. Nevertheless it is not difficult to tell a reasonably coherent story of His life and to form a clear impression of His personality.

We are familiar with the pictures that various

biographers have drawn of the childhood and youth of Jesus; and these may or may not correspond to the facts of the case. But all this is purely speculative and for our purpose impertinent. All that seems sure is that there had been kindled in His mind during those obscure years a vision, a sense of a divine vocation. His public career commenced with His baptism, which was the sign of His self-dedication to His mission; and the story of the Voice and the Dove is a dramatisation of some experience that brought Him clear confirmation of His call.

What He conceived His mission to be at that moment, we have no means of knowing. We can only infer it from the little we know about his early preaching. Presently we find Him going through the villages of Galilee preaching the good news of the Kingdom of Heaven, a new order of life springing from the inward rule of God. For the moment, however, it is enough to note that He came out of the waters of baptism with the conviction that He was the chosen herald of the Kingdom.

It is in the episode of the Temptation that we first begin to savour the personal quality of Jesus. The Temptation has been variously interpreted, but its significance would appear to be that it was a sifting of methods. The story is a graphic and dramatic summary of what must have been a long process of heart-searching during the early stages of His ministry; and

out of it emerged the conviction that the method of the Kingdom was "the way of God's rule in however few, and the patient endurance of love however long." The three temptations were invitations to take "the short cut," which has always been the peril and has often been the frustration of the prophet and the reformer. The temptation to turn the stones into bread was that He should win a hearing for "the good news" by establishing a reputation as a provider of good bread to a hungry people—a temptation to use the expedient of bribery; the second was a temptation to use the methods of sensationalism, to gain a following by winning for Himself the fame of a prodigy. We know how sedulously Jesus tried to avoid a name for working miracles even of a humane kind; for He foresaw that a reputation as a feeder of the hungry or as a wonder-worker would throw a smoke-screen over what He felt His first business to be. The temptation to worship Satan was a temptation to some form of compromise, and probably belongs to a late point in His early ministry. It would appear to have been an offer of power and influence as the reward of alliance with the constituted authorities, which is the old subtle trick of authority for taming the rebel. The temptations were directed to induce Him to abandon respectively faith (i.e. in God and in the spiritual nature of men), reason and integrity. But His spiritual intuitions showed Him that to do any one of these things would cut the nerve

of His mission from the start. He saw that the only way for Him to take was the way of faith, of quiet rationality, of the incorruptible mind. To worldly wisdom that would seem to be the longest way round; but it was the only way there.

So far as the records give us any clue, this was the spirit of the Galilean ministry. He went about the village synagogues and bade people repent, for the Kingdom of Heaven was at hand. Whatever apocalyptic content there may have been in His preaching at the first, Jesus had almost certainly abandoned the hope of an immediate general and triumphant realisation of the Kingdom, before the end of the first stage of His ministry. It is not difficult to see how it came about. The first preaching was eagerly listened to; folk are always ready to hear anyone who foretells a "good time coming." But when information reached Jerusalem of this new religious ferment in Galilee, the Temple authorities sent emissaries to enquire into it. They first appear at the healing of the paralytic. "There were present," says St. Luke, "Pharisees and doctors of the law from every city of Galilee and Judea and from Jerusalem," evidently a sort of demonstration in force. For the rest of the Galilean ministry they dogged the footsteps of Jesus, playing the rôle of inquisitors and *agents-provocateurs.* Even in Mark's summary account, we see how assiduous they were. They charged him with vulgarising and cheapening religion by sitting down to

meat with publicans and sinners, they harried him for discouraging the holy and indispensable rule of regular fasting. But the climax of the persecution came on the question of Sabbath observance and was reached at the healing of the man with the withered hand on the Sabbath in the synagogue at Capernaum. Both Jesus and His enemies were profoundly moved; and it is clear that Jesus regarded the incident as for Himself being a parting of the ways.

What happened, I believe, was this. He had hoped and believed that the Kingdom might be ushered in on the crest of a spiritual renewal within the existing religious institutions of His people. But after the first initial uprising of popular sympathy and acceptance, He began to encounter sustained and more or less systematic obstruction at the hands of the ecclesiastical authorities. Of this the Gospels give us no more than samples. But they are significant. Jesus found Himself confronted with opposition, involved in exasperating and barren controversy, when He wanted to be about the simple business of declaring the good news and bidding people make ready for the Kingdom. When at last He discovered that the instances and sanctions of organised religion had become a plain negation of a simple and elementary humanity, and that the synagogue was tied down to that kind of religion, He seems to have said, "This is no place for me," and thereupon withdrew to the sea, as Mark says.

What is significant is that after this He never, except on one doubtful occasion, entered a synagogue again. It marks a definite abandonment of His original hope that the Kingdom might be ushered in on the crest of a spiritual quickening within the contemporary religious channels. Perhaps, also, it meant an equally definite abandonment of the hope of an early and general coming of the Kingdom.

With that closes the first and begins the second period of His public life.

3. The Inner Crisis of Jesus

It is significant that immediately after the withdrawal from the synagogue, Jesus proceeds to consolidate the group of disciples who had attached themselves to His person. Jesus, whether out of reasoned conviction or by some sure instinct, recognised the need of a society for the purposes of the Kingdom. The old society had proved impossible; there was nothing therefore to do but to lay the foundations of a new. The twin parables of the old wineskin and the old garment, which were spoken about this time, give us a clue to what was in His mind. The common impulse of the prophet and the reformer, confronted by the obstructive inertia of an old institution, is to try to overthrow and to destroy it. But Jesus's thought ran deeper. The tragedy of most revolutions and reformations has been that they have disrupted the old without laying the founda-

tions of a new order. Jesus apparently perceived the futility and the waste of this procedure. Believing that there was a new life coming that the old wineskin could not contain, He sets about the creation of a new wineskin. The new life required a new organ in and by which to exercise itself; and the old institution could be left to die through its own sheer want of function.

It was, however, one thing to organise a band of disciples, and quite another to make them fit for their task. This, I think, was the main intention of the next period of the ministry, certainly of the latter part of it. Jesus did indeed carry on His preaching, but in the open air. If, however, He had expected that withdrawal from the synagogue would give Him immunity from the attentions of the Pharisees and the Scribes, He was soon to find Himself mistaken. Indeed, the pursuit became more troublesome and dangerous. The Pharisees took counsel with the Herodians, the court party; and it was, as Professor Burkitt says, as though they had told the police. The matter evidently reached the ears of Herod, who had at the time a very bad conscience over the affair of John the Baptist; and his interest seemed to Jesus to be somewhat ominous. At that moment He had no wish to precipitate a conflict with Herod. He had yet to make provision for the future. He had no sense that His work was yet done. Consequently He left the jurisdiction of Herod, and went into the semi-pagan region of Syrophenicia, going

as far north as Tyre and Sidon, and then travelling by a leisurely circuit east and south, until He reached Decapolis. From certain indications in the text, it would appear that about eight months was spent upon this journey. Jesus may have assumed that within this time the public excitement would have died down and with it its attendant perils. He did actually cross over to Galilee, only, however, to find that His enemies were still on the ground and that the danger remained acute. The result was that He had hardly landed when He betook Himself to a boat and sailed over to Bethsaida, which was just outside the jurisdiction of Herod. Thence He and the disciples journeyed northward to the neighbourhood of Cæsarea, and at that place and time the second period of His ministry comes to an end.

At some point in this period, the disciples had been out on a preaching mission; and Jesus asks them, presumably after they had found themselves secure from pursuit, what impression they found He had made on the common people. This question had to do with certain conclusions that He had come to in His own mind concerning His own future, which must presently be discussed. What the answer He received meant to Him we cannot say, except that whatever He had in mind for the future could count on a present background of popular friendliness. But He immediately followed up the question with another, *Whom do ye*

think that I am? And Peter, always ready with his word, gave answer, *Thou art the Christ.* In the three Synoptic accounts Jesus is reported to have forbidden the disciples to publish abroad their conviction concerning Him.

Now, the answer seems in some way to have been decisive for Jesus. For immediately after, He begins to adumbrate His next step. But what did the answer mean? Are we to take *Christ* as the equivalent of the *Messiah?* The word itself does not necessarily carry that content. Probably it did carry a Messianic meaning to Peter himself; and Jesus forbade him to talk about it, lest His own mission miscarry by the attribution to it of the political expectations which then gathered around the Messianic hope. Perhaps Jesus Himself accepted it as synonymous with Messiah. But it is sure that in that case He filled the Messianic idea with a different content from the current view of it. The only thing that we can safely infer from the use of the word here is that the disciples perceived that Jesus had a divine commission, that He was not merely a teacher but one whose vocation it was to *do,* even more than to teach. They saw that His destiny lay not in a life of local preaching or in the founding of a sect, but in some active and large fashion on the plane of the public life of the nation. That at least was secure in the disciples' minds, secure enough to enable Jesus to begin to unveil His future programme.

But what was this programme? During the Syrophœnician interval, Jesus had no doubt been thinking out His own problem. His public ministry in the synagogues had been frustrated, and His subsequent experience in Galilee had shown Him that the tireless pursuit of the religious authorities and their intrigues with the Herodians would make quite impossible a preaching ministry in the country at large. What was He then to do? Was He to be content with a purely private and, as it were, underground propaganda? There was plainly too much at stake to make that a practical solution. There was the whole future to be thought about, and the disciples whom He had called to the task. His sense of His own significance called for action of a more positive and drastic kind than a mere subterranean diffusion of the good news. Moreover, there was an obstruction to be cleared out of the way; and that obstruction was a public thing, a circumstance to be met publicly and, as Jesus saw, to be challenged in its own stronghold. So it grew upon him that he must go up to Jerusalem.

To Jerusalem, where was concentrated the strength of this evil thing that thwarted Him, and denied to the human spirit its inheritance in the Kingdom of God. There were the traditionalists, the politicians, the governing classes, and the multitude that worshipped "this world's unspiritual God." There were the temple authorities who had opened the sacred precincts to an

illicit traffic, and saw their undoing in the spread of Jesus's influence. There were also tories who (as Walter Bagehot might have said) were "cross with the agony of a new idea." Jerusalem was the metropolis of organised reaction and corruption; and thither, Jesus, being what He was, had to go. It was palpably the road of destiny; there was now nothing left to Him to do but to stand in His own person over against that whole complex mass of obstruction that hindered the Kingdom, and to show to His people the nature of their moral trouble, the whole black thing that was wrong with their life and was cheating them of their inheritance, by standing in the face of it and letting it work out its utmost logic upon his own person, before the eyes of all men.

4. The Crisis in Jerusalem

Plainly Jesus had concluded that He must employ a different strategy. We gain the clue that gives coherency to the account of His life in His desire to win His own people into the Kingdom of God so that —in the spirit of the finest prophetic hope—they might become its torch-bearers to mankind. But the cunning and assiduity of His enemies prevented Him from reaching the people; and the Teacher had to become the Doer in order to present the issue to the multitude. Presently the people would be going up to Jerusalem for the Passover. His disciples had brought Him evi-

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dence that the people still believed in Him; and He had enough faith in them to expect that when they saw the issue between Himself and those who were obstructing Him, between the Kingdom of Heaven and the kingdoms of the world, dramatised vividly by the challenge of His own person and word to the "world" of that time, they would perceive it and rally to Himself and the Kingdom of God.

The details of the journey to Jerusalem are somewhat confusing. But they need not now trouble us. For while the incidents of the journey give us additional light upon the character of Jesus, they give us little new light upon the immediate purpose of the journey. But after passing through Jericho, the narrative is once more clear.

The striking thing from this point is the public character that Jesus was deliberately giving to His visit to the capital. From the moment He comes within the sight of the city, He seems determined to provoke public attention, in marked contrast to the sought-out obscurity of His later Galilean movements.

The first of these public acts was the manner of His entry into the city. Here He is indeed not only inviting publicity, but calling attention to the nature of His mission. Nothing could indeed show more clearly the symbolic and representative character which He was claiming for Himself. It is Daniel's vision of the one like unto a son of man, but this time enacted in char-

acter. Jesus went into Jerusalem riding upon an ass, to affirm, in the imagery of an old prophecy, the sovereignty of the Son of Man and of Humanity in Him. It was in a sense a political demonstration, a public protest against the subordination of man to political systems, a public demand for the subordination of political systems to humane ends. It was addressed not only to the Romans, but also, and perhaps chiefly, to His own countrymen, at least to those of them who were ready to sacrifice the treasure of life to the empty dream of an ambiguous political independence.

The second public act was the cleansing of the Temple. It is commonly, but too hastily, supposed that this was done in the heat of a sudden indignation. It was on the contrary done with deliberation. When He entered the city, we are told that "He looked round about Him upon all things," and one of these things was undoubtedly the unholy traffic in the temple precincts. But He did nothing that day. He went to spend the night at Bethany; then returned the next morning and cleared the holy place of the traders who were defiling it. Not that He held these people responsible for the infamy. He knew only too well that the traffic was encouraged by the temple authorities, who found in it a rich source of revenue. If the entry into the city had been a political, this was essentially a religious demonstration, a public protest against the prostitution of the sanctuary to corrupt ends, a public

demand for pure religion and undefiled at the sources of the public religious life of His people.

These two incidents, however, only suggest the complexity of the situation which Jesus confronted. We shall fail to understand the workings of His mind in the days following if we do not take fuller account of the position in Jerusalem.

First, there was the political factor. There was the Roman dominion, holding by force a territory to which it had no title, and by the people of which it was not wanted. But Jesus was less concerned with the Roman occupation than He was with His people's reaction to it. This reaction was of three kinds. The first was represented by Herod and his following, who were openly and frankly friendly to Rome; the second was that represented by the orthodox religious schools, which hated the Roman occupation but temporised with it. The third was that represented by the party which was later called the Zealots, who hated it and desired to overthrow it. Only one of these parties did Jesus take seriously and sympathetically, the only honest party among them; and to them a good deal of His profoundest public teaching was addressed. This was the revolutionary party, who proposed to oppose force to force, that ancient illusion by which this poor race of ours has been fooled and undone throughout its history. Jesus perceived the futility of this policy and foresaw its inevitable consequences. He told them that "they

that take the sword shall perish by the sword." He predicted the doom of the city which did not know the things that belonged to its peace. His policy was of another kind. The Romans with their political astuteness granted a considerable margin of religious freedom to the Jews, and Jesus saw within that margin the possibility of a spiritual culture by which the nation might realise its own distinctive and independent life at a far deeper level than a mere political independence could reach. By a policy of good will toward the Romans, this margin might be indefinitely extended, and perhaps even the Roman might be brought within the covenant. Political independence was an external, a secondary thing, a mere shell; what mattered was the quickening and expansion of the spiritual life of the nation. A policy of good will would make possible the supreme thing that mattered; and the rest could take care of itself. That was the issue that was presented dramatically in the choice between Barabbas and Jesus. It was between the policy of force and the policy of good will, between the strategy of the flesh and the strategy of the spirit. The Jews chose Barabbas, as we know, and the policy of force against force in due time worked out its inevitable logic. In little more than a generation, Jerusalem was razed to the ground; and since that day the Jews have virtually been a homeless people.

The moral situation was equally acute. Jerusalem

was like any other metropolitan city, the focus of reaction and corruption, but with two peculiar circumstances in addition. First was a very high publicly professed moral standard; second, the presence of an active agent of moral deterioration in the shape of a pagan civilisation which was hybrid, and like most hybrids containing the worst ingredients of its parts. Jesus's warning against the "leaven" of Herod was undoubtedly an allusion to the pagan morals of that dissolute princeling. The questions about divorce that we meet in the later history of Jesus were provoked by the most scandalous divorce case in ancient history, the shameful amours of Herod and Herodias. And when Jesus spoke of the leaven of Herod, He was indicating His own sense of the diffusion of this demoralising influence. Herod, who was the focus of this corruption, had also come up to Jerusalem at this time. The corruption of the Temple, moreover, is a symptom which tells a story of grave social demoralisation. A society that could tolerate organised "graft" in its holy place was far gone in moral decay.

The religious situation is sufficiently familiar. Public religion was a formal externalised affair; and with that went, as it always does, a considerable centralisation of authority. And centralised authority means vested interests. There were first the Sadducees, who held the high-priesthood and its satellite functions, and had no mind to surrender them to any one. There were

the scribes too who held a vested interest in ecclesiastical scholarship, a scholarship then very much in its dotage; and there is nothing in the world quite so reactionary as the academic mind run to seed and entrenched behind its privileges. The Pharisees too had their pretensions, though they seem to have been little more at this time than the scribes' jackals. The religious life of the country was doomed to stagnation. Jesus had seen that already in Galilee. The vested interests of scribe and priest must not be disturbed; so neither revival nor reform seemed possible. This massed obstruction of vested interests stood solidly in the way of the Kingdom.

This then was the situation; it was not simple. These strained human situations never are. Evil has a way of growing impersonal, of entrenching itself in "systems," as we say, which combine into an intractable mass of public evil. Jesus found Himself standing over against a strangely tangled world of which the symbols were Barabbas, Herod and Caiaphas. The Kingdom of God was opposed by a triple alliance of violence, vice and vested interests. And this was the threefold issue that Jesus had come to propound in His own person. He was the symbol of the Kingdom of God, the divine order of life for man. Would the people choose His world, the world of the Son of Man, or the world of Barabbas, Caiaphas and Herod? But there was perhaps a previous question. Would the

people perceive the issue before them? Could they divine the gulf that was fixed between the Kingdom of Love and the kingdom of violence? Between the moral demands of the divine order and the corruption of Herodian society? Between the free and living religion of the Son of Man and the bound dead religion of Caiaphas?

He had come up to Jerusalem in the hope that they would. His question about the state of public opinion concerning Him at Cæsarea Philippi, and the answer He received, seemed to make it promising enough to put the matter to the proof. The enthusiasm which His entry into Jerusalem had provoked had for the moment confirmed this assurance. Not that He had any illusions as to what would happen to Himself. He had historical precedent enough to know that He himself would be rejected of the chief priests and scribes, whatever the people might do; and He clearly foresaw His own death. But would the people see the point even if He allowed the evil thing to show itself in its true colours by working out its own consequences upon Him and destroying Him? I gather that His experience after the cleansing of the Temple had made Him very doubtful whether the people would see the inwardness of what was at stake. And that misgiving comes to a head in Gethsemane. He saw the practical certainty that the people would make the wrong choice. He foresaw what that would mean. It would be the last

wild plunge into spiritual bankruptcy and moral insolvency; it would be the final forfeiture of that vocation and destiny to which the people had been called and for which they had been prepared by their long historical discipline. They were on the brink of the Great Refusal. Is it wonderful that Jesus should have shrunk from forcing the issue through to its last term? It seems to me to have been perfectly natural that He should have hesitated from a prospect which could not fail to make His soul, as He said, exceeding sorrowful. But not all His heart-searching could find Him absolution from the dark task. He found that He had to go through with it.

5. The Cross

The end was inevitable. The ecclesiastical authorities had made up their minds that Jesus should die, and when they had made sure that there would be no grave popular opposition to encounter, they set about their purpose with a grim resolution. The court business before the high-priest was dispatched without ceremony; and Pilate's feeble hesitations were early overcome. Jesus was hurried to Golgotha and there was crucified. And so far as Caiaphas and Pilate were concerned, the trouble was over.

Yet we face this amazing paradox—that ever since that day the incident on Calvary has stood out as the most significant event in recorded history. We may

say that the Cross happened at a certain time in a certain place; but that is the least that we say about it. For we are raised above the world of events in time and space into a world of "values." The fact grows into a symbol; the act is transfigured into a revelation. It is difficult to resist the sense that as we stand before the Cross we are in the presence of something like absolute moral distinctions. In our greatest human crises, the issue is never wholly clear. There is confusion of motives. It is a conflict between shades of grey. But on Calvary, it is black against white, midnight against midday, with no blurred edges and no twilight zone.

Any one who looks upon the trial and death of Jesus with any realism of moral insight sees all the positions reversed. We perceive that that day before the high court of heaven, as now before the high court of history, it was the prisoner who sat in judgement, and the judges who stood in the dock; and the height of irony was reached when, after they had condemned Him to death, He from His gibbet recommended them to mercy. It is necessary to enquire wherein this moral ascendancy of Jesus lies.

We are so habituated to the story that it no longer strikes us as remarkable that Jesus was not provoked to bitterness and retaliation; for indeed He had provocation enough. What indignity and injustice a man might suffer, He suffered; false witness, crooked judgement, insult and derision—all came to Him. But no

word escaped His lips in anger or derision. Whatever else might befall Him, bitterness should not. He declined to treat as enemies men who regarded themselves as His enemies. Nor was this an attitude merely negative. How positive it was appears in that signal and dramatic moment when He prayed from the Cross that His enemies might be forgiven. He had come through the mire of hate and lies, and it had left neither spot nor stain on His love; and the final insult of the crucifixion left it untouched and undiminished. "Courage in strife," says Mr. H. M. Tomlinson, "is common enough; even the dogs have it. But the courage which can face the ultimate defeat of a life of good will and yet crave forgiveness for a wild and angry mob, because ignorance has no light, that is different. That is victory, if that fine word has any meaning at all."

This is victory, indeed; this miracle of invincible forgivingness. But it does not stand alone. Presently Jesus speaks again—a word charged with the sorrows of all time: "My God, My God, why hast thou forsaken me?" Jesus was quoting from a psalm that had been sung of a sorrow like His own; and in this final moment of darkness these words came naturally to His lips. It is difficult to reconcile this word with a rigid traditional view of the person of Jesus; but the word has to be accepted as it is, and in what it implies. It is an admission of final failure, the extinction of the last

lingering hope. The fear which had driven Jesus into the garden had come true. Even to the last He had hoped wistfully and hungrily for some flash of light that might at the eleventh hour save this people, whom He loved and upon whom He had staked His expectation of the Kingdom of God, from the great refusal. But as the tide of life ebbed away, hope died within Him.

Then a few moments later He said, "It is finished." He meant simply: this is the end of everything. We have sometimes wrested this word from its setting and reversed its meaning, as though Jesus had meant: My work is now successfully accomplished. But Jesus did not mean that He had succeeded; He meant that He had failed. If one's doctrine of the Person of Jesus requires one to believe that Jesus saw something beyond that moment, then the cry of dereliction is meaningless and insincere, as though in that terrible passage Jesus was play-acting. The word can only be reasonably interpreted as meaning that Jesus felt that He had utterly failed, and that God (as the saying is) had gone back on Him.

Need we wonder at this? He had lived His life for one thing; and that (as He believed) at the call of God. He gave His nights and His days to the winning of His people into the Kingdom of God in the faith that it was their destiny to become its heralds to the world. His business had been to rescue and recreate Israel; and

here was Israel before His eyes committing suicide and repudiating His hope and theirs. It is not strange that He should suppose that His work had miscarried, and that He should wonder what God was about that He should suffer this thing to come to pass. Had He not believed and taught that God would vindicate love and faithfulness? And now, where was God? He was distressed not because God was letting Him die, but because God was letting Him fail.

It is, however, to be observed that the cry was "My God, My God"; it was a cry of faith no less than of despair. We are faced with the astonishing paradox that though He supposed God had forsaken Him, he still trusted God. Though He slay me, said Job, yet will I trust Him. But Jesus goes further. Even though God turn His back on me and let my work end in utter failure and suffer me to die unvindicated, yet will I trust Him. The prayer for His enemies had revealed an unyielding love; the cry of dereliction revealed an undefeated faith. The great task He had lived for had to miscarry that His faith might be proved invincible. The work had to fail in order that the Worker should have a perfect victory. This is a feat no less prodigious than the other—to hold an undefeated faith in the teeth of utter failure, to see hope die and that even then faith should live, to face the blackness of despair and still to go on trusting God.

Here lies the primary power of the Cross—this spec-

tacle of a love that would not let go of man and of a faith that would not let go of God. It might have satisfied a certain sentimental sense of dramatic fitness in us, if the prayer for His enemies had broken their heart and brought them contrite to their knees; or if God by some miracle had delivered Him from the Cross in the face of His dumbfoundered enemies. But the perennial astonishment of His faith and His love remains because He drank the cup of failure to the dregs and His life went out in darkness. He would not stand upon the height upon which He does stand, if Calvary had had the kind of happy ending that sentimentality might crave. He stands where He does because He had no relief, saw no compensation ahead, and God did not interfere. To have given himself to a great redemptive task, to be resisted and frustrated again and again, but still to go on without bitterness and without despair, and in the end to be finally defeated, yet in that hour to keep love and faith unspotted and undiminished—that is the topmost height of life. To love when hate is trampling you under foot in its mud, to go on trusting God, when your dearest hope lies dead, as Jesus did—this is the final splendour of personality.

On the one hand, then, the forces that make for death, the unholy trinity of violence, vice and vested interests; on the other the forces that make for life, faith and love. Upon this event, the common sense of

mankind has long passed judgement. Pilate and Caiaphas rank with the common hangman; Barabbas is the symbol of a long-lost cause. Herod is a contemptible byword. But the Victim has a name above every name.

That, as I see it, is the Christian event.

III

GOD IN CHRIST

1. The Cross in History

I WANT to recall to your minds a point which I dwelt on for a moment in the last lecture, but which requires more attention than we then paid to it. The Cross stands out as the most significant event in recorded history. But why? The Cross happened at a certain place on a certain day; but that, as I have said before, is the least thing we say about it. For what we feel when we contemplate the Cross with any measure of moral realism is that we are in the presence of something that looks like an absolute moral antithesis. In our greatest human crises the issue is never clear; it is confused by conflicting motives and cross-purposes. Our struggles are always between shades of grey, between the "rather more" and the "rather less." There has never been a human quarrel in which the right has all been on the one side and all the wrong on the other, though in times of war we are pleased to think so. But on Calvary there is no confusion of issues. It is midnight against midday, stark and without compromise. That is why at the Cross we seem

to rise above the world of events in time and space into a world of "values" which recognise no time or space. The fact grows into a perennial symbol. There is a certain universality about the Cross which makes it contemporary with every age in every land. Its place is everywhere; its date is all time.

Times change, we say; and so they do. And human nature changes with them. It changes its ideas, its habits, its manners, its morals. Sometimes it changes for the better, sometimes for the worse. But there is one thing that does not change. As long as we have any intelligible record of man, it is clear that he has recognised that there is such a thing as right and its opposite wrong. This sense has not always the same vigour or the same incisiveness. It has often been crude and vague and dull. Nor has the line between right and wrong been at all times unmistakably plain; there has always been a debatable borderland between them. None the less, mankind has been always clear about the difference between rightness and wrongness; and it has recognised this distinction as something authoritative, absolute, not to be argued about. It has accepted it as belonging to the nature of things. It believes that there is a moral order in the world which is never suspended or abrogated, cannot be repealed or appealed from; and at the Cross, it has seen the everlasting opposition of right and wrong focussed down to one terrific and unmistakable antithesis. So the

Cross is still here in the world, its voice unsilenced and its challenge undiminished; and men looking at it intelligently feel that it is a matter of life and death where they stand in relation to it. It was, as the writer of the Fourth Gospel says, the judgement, the "crisis" of this world. The event is symbolical of a permanent crisis and conflict in human life, and it forces a choice upon men and upon human societies.

But it is to be remembered that the Cross was the inevitable sequel of a life. The late Joseph Parker once said that Jesus was never off the Cross; and the issue which reached its climax in the moment of the Cross was being defined through all the public ministry of Jesus, defined by His being what He was over against the world that this is. The Jesus of the Temptation is also the Jesus of the Cross; and the event of Calvary happened because Jesus was what He was in the world that surrounded Him.

The Cross has no significance for men except it be conceived primarily as a historical, that is, a terrestrial event, taking its own place in the natural sequence of human events. Theology has tended in the past to abstract it from its historical setting, to make of it a transaction of high celestial politics; and instead of being a burning sign upon our skyline, at once judging us and beckoning us, it has been too much treated as a sort of business deal, a bargain settled, a bill paid, a debt discharged, a payment made. But the Cross hap-

pened in our world; it has its historical antecedents and its historical consequences. It has its own place in the flow of events; and there is no hope of reaching a final understanding of its significance unless we first of all study it in its immediate setting. Since it happened in our world it must have an ancestry that goes back to the beginnings of life itself. And to be fully understood it must be seen in its relation to the whole process of life.

It is obvious that in the brief space of these lectures we cannot undertake so long a study. It will have to suffice for the moment to observe that man as we know him is the latest term in a process of evolution. Something, as I have said elsewhere, that probably began in the ooze of the sea has grown up into something that built the Parthenon and Rheims Cathedral, wrote the *Iliad,* the *Divine Comedy* and *Hamlet,* composed the *Messiah* and the *Ninth Symphony.* The pedigree is indeed not without its gaps; but it is sufficiently full to justify us in believing it to be an authentic pedigree. So that if we can descry the meaning of the Cross in relation to man, we shall be able to know something of its meaning in relation to the whole process of life.

But the history of man is ambiguous. If man built Rheims Cathedral, man also destroyed it. That simple statement epitomises the whole historical conflict of man; and it is precisely this disharmony which reaches its climax in the event of the Cross. Of the presence

of this disharmony in the universe we shall have to take fuller account presently. We observe it here in order to make clear in what region of history we have to seek the ancestry of the event of the Cross. Man is divided against himself, because he is divided within himself; and this conflict is persistent throughout his entire history. Indeed, man has two histories. But the professional history of the schools seems chiefly to be the history of man's failure to be a man. It would be difficult to trace in it any orderly development; and that mankind should have been capable of the Great War, after so long an experience of the self-defeating folly of war, is not reassuring evidence of its continued growth. But there is a "history" of man other than the chronicle of kings and queens, of wars and conquests. This better history is for the most part unrecorded; for it consists in the love and labour of the innumerable company of obscure and anonymous folk who have carried the burden of life from one generation to another, and of whom we catch hardly more than an occasional glimpse through the thick murk of war and intrigue which fills the pages of the chroniclers and which has little affected more than a minority of mankind. It is indeed when this obscure life, oppressed beyond endurance, has irrupted though the *haute politique* of the mighty, that history begins to look real. The true history of man as man is that which tells how men acquired wisdom and knowledge, how they learned

to live with one another, how they grew to admire and to aspire after goodness, truth and beauty. It is the history of man's discovery and culture of his spirit; and of that there is not a great deal in the political and public records. We have to turn rather to the quiet places where men have lived and loved, thought and wrought faithfully in obedience to some intuition which directed them to the things best worth living for. Our search will take us, for the greater part, to schools rather than to senates, to wheat fields rather than to battlefields, to workshops rather than to throne rooms, to cottages rather than to castles. Most of our conventional history is a chronicle of the "ape and tiger" in man. But there is a history, too, of the spiritual achievement of man, but because this has not been spectacular it has gone for the most part unrecorded.

It is in this latter history that the "event" of Jesus in life and death finds its place; and over against this event and throwing it into sharp and bold relief is the traditional world of violence, vice and privilege. Some of the antecedents of the event are reported to us in the Hebrew scriptures, most notably in the growth of prophecy, which constitutes the supreme historical distinction of the Jewish people: but most of the story remains untold. But told or untold, the story reaches its climax on the Cross. That moment is the spiritual C major of the race; and the prayers of Jesus on the Cross—for his enemies and for himself—register the

high-water mark of human relations and of human aspiration.

To sum up then: the crown of life is man; the crown of man is Jesus; the crown of Jesus is the Cross; the crown of the Cross is the unconquered love and the invincible faith of Jesus. Here is the revelation of the supreme human values.

2. The Grand Anomaly

But that is far from being the end of the matter. We have not said all that needs to be said of Jesus when we have spoken of Him and of His achievement as the perfect flowering of human personality. It is necessary to attend to the impression that Jesus has left upon mankind; and this may be described by saying that Jesus has had an absolute value for man. He stands on the human horizon as the goal of aspiration and endeavour; and when men have tried to "place" Him, they have almost always placed Him in the highest category they are able to conceive.

This feeling about Jesus appeared early. The writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews is very insistent upon the identity of the human nature of Jesus with ours. But he is equally clear that there is a difference. To him, Jesus is the great exception, the grand anomaly. He was tempted in all points as we are, yet without sin. He was bone of our bone, flesh of our flesh, yet He alone of us all has been crowned with glory and honour.

His explanation of this uniqueness, you will remember, is that God who had spoken to the fathers through the prophets had at last spoken in a Son. And this sense of the uniqueness of Jesus runs through the whole of the New Testament; and how pressing was the need of explanation of it is clear from the growth of the story of His miraculous birth.

And when we pass beyond the New Testament, we find the same thing. In the world that lay around the Eastern Mediterranean, there were three words upon which the hope of the human race rested—Messiah, Kurios, Logos. Within a generation or two of His death all these three names had been attached to Jesus. Not all Jews called Him the Messiah, for the Messiah of contemporary popular religion was a political figure who was expected to perform a political miracle. But there were many Jews who did not hesitate to call Jesus the long-expected Messiah. In the Greek world, the longing for salvation and atonement which grew in the desolate period following the decline of Greek religion expressed itself in the growth and spread of cults, mostly of oriental origin, each of which gathered around a *Kurios,* a lord. There were, as St. Paul says, lords many; but of all the lords on whom in those days men set store, Jesus alone has survived. The word Logos had a long history before it came to have a Christian use; and it recalls the long search of the Greek mind for the clue to the mystery of existence.

But somewhere in the last quarter of the first century it was confidently declared that the Logos had become flesh and dwelt among us in the person of Jesus of Nazareth. So early was Jesus placed in the highest religious and intellectual categories that men had yet conceived. For some centuries after the first, Christian men were eagerly engaged in discussion of the person of Jesus; but concerning one thing, there was no discussion. All Christian men were agreed about the place of Jesus. Athanasius and Arius were of one mind on this point. They differed only about what they called the *substance* of Jesus. No one doubted Jesus's title to the highest rank that could by any means be thought of. And in the end the ancient church declared that he was on an equality with God, and even more, of the same substance with God.

And thus it has been through the ages when men have looked upon Jesus with a sympathetic understanding. To Dante, He was the risen and glorified Redeemer, the incarnadine heart of the white rose of the redeemed. Shelley saw in Him the supreme Poet and Reformer. William Blake looked upon Him and discovered at once the Incarnation of the Poetic Genius and the divine Centre of the human family. To Tennyson, he was the "Strong Son of God" who brought life and incorruption to light through the Gospel; and to Browning He was the clue to the mystery of life and the universe. Francis Thompson discovered in Him the

ubiquitous omnipresent Christ whose glory breaks through the crust of common things for those who have eyes to see. Savonarola proposed to the citizens of Florence that they should enthrone Him as their King. Mazzini worshipped Him as the hope and ground of a redeemed humanity. Ruskin held him forth as the great Master who sets us all to work and sustains us while we are at it.[1] In these last days, we find Mr. Bruce Barton discovering in Him the attributes of a contemporary commercial magnate; and Mr. Middleton Murry, whose heroes are Shakespeare and Keats, declares that "The greatest of my heroes is Jesus"—Jesus whom he describes as "a man of genius." And so we might go on without end.

It may be said that this is an achievement of the imagination, that Jesus was the lay figure upon which these persons draped their own ideals or the objects of their desire. But this misses the fact that Jesus is the only figure in history that has been treated in this way, whose shoulders have been found broad enough to carry this extraordinary variety of rôles. Not one of these rôles but is fit for a superman; yet this one person steps into them all without awkwardness or incongruity. The world has had its saints and heroes, yet none of them has received treatment like this. Each has his own category and there he stays. But when men have conceived the highest categories they are capable of conceiving, they put Jesus into them and

they find that He fits. Nor is He a mere legend that men can shape to the form of their own fancies. They have the record of His life to appeal to; and whatever legendary accretions may be present in the story as we have it, the story was set down too early to have itself become a legend.

Nor is this treatment of Jesus confined to this man or that, here and there, in history. It has come down in an unbroken succession from the earliest days. No historical figure has proved to be more permanently interesting to all sorts and conditions of men, old and young, learned and unlearned, cultured and uncultured, great and small, none whose life has been so often written or whose face so often imagined and painted. If you sit down to write the history of the world, you divide it into two parts—the old time before Him, the new time after Him. "How came it to pass," asks Rudolf Eucken, with great pertinence, "that this particular point of time was the fountainhead of so mighty a movement, that old ideals were shattered and new ones arose, that the whole previous balance of life was upset and previous standards failed to satisfy, that a mighty longing took possession of mankind, a stormy unrest which even now after hundreds of years is not allayed?" [2] A short time before that great journalist H. W. Massingham died, he wrote an article entitled, "The Religion of a Journalist," in which he said: "But Jesus, one felt, was not like that. And going back to

the Bible, and with the aid of modern criticism simplifying the story of his life, as the imaginative reader loves to simplify it, I saw it was elemental stuff, and that out of it was made all the goodness I had ever come in contact with. Thus there was truth in Swedenborg's vision of Christ as the Grand Man, who somehow came in to save the world from being destroyed by its own selfishness, as well as by its tendency to go on believing what was no longer believable. This model of true living was always being lost and always being rediscovered. In this sense the 'Coming of Jesus' of the orthodox was a religious truth. It was a going back, like Christian after his lost scroll to the foundations of society." [3] Observe the words, "elemental stuff," "a going back to the foundations of society"; and it is precisely this sense of being taken back to the beginning of things that leads the writer of the Fourth Gospel, as he contemplates Jesus, back to the Logos that was in the beginning with God.

Plainly, a person who is able to assume all these rôles must somehow be greater than any of them, and greater than all of them. A person who fills all the highest conceivable categories stands in a category of his own. Jesus is not only a person; He seems to be a universe of personality.

There is, to be sure, something to be said on the other side. Swinburne reflects a different attitude in his resentment against the "pale Galilean," who has sup-

pressed the pagan joy and colour of life. But this is obviously a poor reading of the facts. It was into a world in which the joy of life was well-nigh dead that Jesus came; and no picture of the pagan world of Greece and Rome in the generations immediately before our era show it to us as anything but jaded and exhausted. The figure of the fresh young shepherd, carrying the kid on his shoulders or playing his pipes, on the walls of the Catacombs is the answer to Swinburne. But a more serious divergence from the general view of Jesus is that which we associate with Nietzsche and his doctrine of the superman. Jesus has stated the ground of the divergence in His own way: "Ye know that the rulers of the Gentiles lord it over them, and their great ones exercise authority over them; not so shall it be among you: but whosoever would be first among you shall be your bond-servant." Jesus was advocating what Nietzsche would call slave-morality; and over against this Nietzsche raised his own gospel of master-morality. Of the former Jesus is at once the exponent and the examplar; the other has its great typical embodiment in Napoleon. As I have written elsewhere, the world has yet to make up its mind finally whether its superman shall be the finished Egoist or the perfect Lover, whether the way of man is the will to power or the will to love: and there is no way of reconciling the antithesis.

These are not the only discordant notes in the human

estimate of Jesus. But taken altogether, the exceptions are so few and scattered that they do but throw into sharper relief the unique place that Jesus has held in the devotion of Western man. We are face to face with a remarkable phenomenon, and it requires some explanation. Mrs. Humphrey Ward recounts how once in the enthusiasm of her early scepticism she said to Walter Pater that orthodoxy could not hold out much longer against the assault of science on the one hand and of literature on the other. To her surprise, Pater shook his head and said, "No, I don't think so; and we don't altogether agree. You think it is all plain; but I cannot. Take that saying, 'Come unto me all ye that are weary and heavy-laden.' How can you explain that? There is a mystery in it, a something supernatural." Undoubtedly there is a mystery.

2. The Emergent Jesus

We find in the New Testament two positions taken up with regard to Jesus:

(1) He is regarded as an anticipation of the human future. St. Paul had preceded Nietzsche with a doctrine of the "superman"; for he regards Jesus at once as the source and the goal of a new humanity. He speaks of the "full grown man of the measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ." Elsewhere he pictures Jesus as "the first-born among many brethren," who have been "conformed to His image." In the famous

passage, "The first Adam became a living soul; the last Adam a life-giving spirit," he is plainly suggesting that just as there is a plane and succession of nature of which the source and archetype is Adam, so there is also a plane and a succession of spirit, the beginning and end of which is Jesus Christ. The writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews evidently has a similar thought; and it is not unfair to argue that in the first Epistle of John the same idea is present—"We know that when he is manifested, we shall be like him," i.e., children of God. Clearly, Jesus is regarded as an anticipation and a revelation of the human future. He is the first "superman," the man beyond man who is yet to be.

(2) But equally is Jesus regarded as the revelation of God. That is the theme of the Fourth Gospel throughout. "The Word became flesh and dwelt among us, and we behold His glory, glory as of the only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth." St. Paul similarly speaks of God who has "shined in our hearts to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ." And the writer of Hebrews also: "God hath at the end of these days spoken unto us in a Son . . . the effulgence of his glory and the very image of his substance." And it is this view of Jesus which in the Fourth Gospel is summarised into the word, "He that seeth me, seeth the Father."

An anticipation of the human future, a revelation

of God—and who knows that these two things may not at bottom be one thing? There is a modern philosophy which holds that the whole universe is tending towards deity. "Within the all-embracing stuff of space-time," writes Professor Alexander, "the universe exhibits an emergence in time of successive levels of finite existences, each with its characteristic empirical quality. The highest of these empirical qualities known to us is the mind or consciousness. Deity is the next higher quality to the highest that we know; and . . . at any level of existence there is a next higher empirical quality which stands to the lower quality as deity stands towards mind." "There is an empirical quality which is to succeed the distinctive empirical quality of our level; and that new empirical quality is deity." "Deity is thus the next higher empirical quality which the universe is engaged in bringing to earth." [6] I cannot persuade myself that we have in this philosophy a sufficient accounting of the mystery of life; but something like it must needs be thought if we are to have a coherent view of a universe in process; and it certainly tallies well with that part of the process that lies within the range of our minds. It was surely a thought akin to this that found expression in St. Paul's picture of the creation groaning and travailing in pain, waiting to be delivered into the liberty of the glory of the children of God.

Professor Alexander goes on to say that we cannot

know that empirical quality which we call "deity." We shall ourselves have to rise to that level before we can apprehend it. "We can neither enjoy it nor still less contemplate it. Our human altars are still raised to the Unknown God. Before we could know what deity is, how it feels to be divine, we should first have to become as God." [5] Here our philosopher is at one with the New Testament. "No man hath seen God at any time." It is obviously true that our minds cannot grasp the quality of deity. Yet one has appeared in time who, for a countless number of people, has satisfied the feeling for deity. For them, Jesus has had absolute worth, has stood for what God is. They have accorded to Him what is the due of God alone, namely, worship; they have prayed to Him; and they have not shrunk from ascribing deity to Him, even though they did not know what deity was.

Yet Jesus stood as man before God; for He prayed to God. While we worship Him, yet He remains one of us. That is the paradox of Jesus. He is as man towards God and as God towards man. That is why Jesus came to be regarded as the forerunner of a new race which should partake of the divine nature as He himself partook of it. Jesus is "human plus."

It may be urged that this estimate of Jesus may be mistaken, time-honoured though it be. But it is impossible to deny the spiritual experience upon which it rests—the recognition of an absolute value in Jesus

which has evoked a devotion unique in its distribution, its persistency, its intensity, and has put Jesus in a class apart from other men. And this spiritual experience must be accepted as a datum for the interpretation of Jesus as valid in its own way as the fact of His history. How else are you going to explain the astonishing industry with which lives of Jesus are still being written? And the equally astonishing fact that even at this date a "life" of Jesus can be a "best seller?" The world evidently wants still to hear from any one who promises to have something fresh to say about Jesus. This shows that so far no one has yet said the crucial word about Jesus. He still transcends our human classifications.

It was the way of St. Paul to lay his hand upon any current image or idea that would serve his purpose in order to expound the truth that was in Him. If he were living today, I have little doubt that in expounding Jesus he would have laid hold of the term "emergent." This term has become a counter of thought through its use by Professor Lloyd Morgan in his work *Emergent Evolution.* It will be easy to grasp what is meant by an emergent if we take an illustration. If you put the appropriate quantities of hydrogen and oxygen into a suitable vessel and then pass an electric spark through it, the result will be the production of water. Measurement will show that the weight of the product is the same as the combined weight of the ingredients.

Everything is there that was there before; and in that sense water is a *resultant.* But the product has a quality which was not there before—whatever it is that makes water something different from a mixture of hydrogen and oxygen. In virtue of this difference, water is an *emergent.*

According to Lloyd Morgan, the process of evolution may be conceived as a "step-like advance with the sudden appearance of new characters." [6] The process is continuous; but it moves along a series of ascending levels at each of which in turn a fresh "emergent" appears. Of these ascending levels, Lloyd Morgan names seven principal levels: atoms, molecules, solids, life, mind, reason, spirit. Professor Macmurray simplifies the scheme; he speaks of the atom, the organism, the person, as the three main stages of development. But whether we accept Alexander's, Lloyd Morgan's or Macmurray's scheme, we have the same principle of emergent levels. There are points in the process of life at which new "characters" appear. If we were to say that the total impression that Jesus has made upon mankind justifies us in regarding him as an "emergent" or as possessing a quality which may be considered to be an "emergent," Lloyd Morgan would not quarrel with us. "If an impartial historical survey should lead to the conclusion that the *nisus* towards deity has culminated in one unique individual, there is, so far as I can see, nothing in the naturalistic interpretation of

emergent evolution which precludes the acceptance of this conclusion." [7] And elsewhere he says that "the Divine Personality shines through the unique individuality of the Christ." [8] We may undoubtedly speak of Jesus as an "emergent" in the field of personality.

According to Alexander, the last term of the ascending series is deity; according to Morgan, it is spirit. Both meet in the New Testament—*God is a spirit.* But in Lloyd Morgan, God is a good deal more than the last term of the series. He is present in the process throughout. "God," he says, "is the nisus directive of the course of events." [9] In his effort to secure the essential unity of all being and to avoid "supernaturalism," he has to include God within the process, which would appear to make God something less than the process as a whole. In which case He is not God. For He would appear to be subservient to the process or to the final result of the process. Lloyd Morgan endeavours to escape this dilemma by affirming that "God is all in all, but in diverse modes and degrees of manifestation." But must we not distinguish between God and His manifestations? And how can the nisus of a course of events be its "all in all"?

The truth is that immanentism is never enough to cover the facts of life. God is in the process. We cannot think of the divine immanence as an inert latency; it is active, and evolution is a mode of its activity. But God must be other than the process. When Professor

Whitehead speaks of God as "a principle of concretion," [10] he implies that God does in some fashion transcend the process; for He would appear on occasions to lay hold of the process or of some part of it, and to bring forth out of it new "events." This same transcendence seems to be implied also in Whitehead's doctrine of the "ingression of eternal objects into particular occasions."[11] These eternal objects are such things as colours, sounds, scents and geometrical characters, which are "required for nature but are not emergent from it." [12] They "ingress" into particular actual occasions, and being concreted into the occasion, bring forth a new actual event. There is plainly here a departure from Lloyd Morgan's rigorous naturalism. There appears to be something working upon the process of nature as from without. If we are justified in assuming with Lloyd Morgan that God is active within the process of nature, we are equally justified in believing that God is also working on the process from without, causing the ingression into it of "eternal objects" and concreting the whole into a new "event." Every "event" seems to be the converging point and the consequence of two movements, the one from within the process, the other from without, and both alike aspects of the same "substantial activity."

We cannot exclude the Christian "event" from this category of "events." We have already seen that religion consists of two coefficient movements, prayer and

revelation; and we have used Professor Whitehead's phraseology in order to illustrate the relation between them. Prayer is the spear point of human aspiration, the continuation on the human plane of the upward striving of life. But we have seen grounds for believing that prayer is evoked and responded to by the unknown eternal that we call God; and this activity we call revelation. But prayer must also be conceived as an activity of the divine immanence in the human person; and revelation as an activity of the divine transcendence towards and upon man.

I have tried to show you how men have seen in Jesus at once the full-grown man and the revelation of God. On the one side, He is the product of the natural process, as we all are, its very crown and glory. But we discern in Him also a quality which goes beyond human nature, as we know it, an "emergent" which compels us to worship—at the very least, to take up to Him an attitude and to give Him a devotion which no other human figure commands from us. We accept Him, to use Lloyd Morgan's words, as the person "in whom the nisus towards deity has culminated in a unique individual." But we are also constrained to regard Him (to use Whitehead's language) as the "particular actual occasion" into which the unknown-eternal has in some unique way "ingressed." He is man towards God; He is God towards man. He is God in man and man in God. In Him the perfect human

aspiration meets with the sufficient revelation of God. The Incarnate Word both came up from the ranks and came down from the throne.

It may be said that this is not the traditional doctrine of the incarnation. But it is necessary to distinguish between the form of that doctrine and the spiritual truth which is embodied in it. The form of the Nicene Doctrine was determined by the thought-forms of its own time. Athanasius and Arius were divided on the question of the "substance" of God and of Jesus, though neither of them knew or could possibly know what "substance" was in this connection. Athanasius contended for the view that the Son was of the *same* substance, while Arius maintained that He was of *like* substance with the Father. The view of Athanasius prevailed, as we know; and the value of that victory lay in the fact that a transcendent God could still be conceived as standing in some sort of organic connection with His human creatures, while if Arius had won the day, a great gulf would have yawned between God and man. But the battle had to be fought out and won on a field determined by the contemporary idiom of thought.

But we have passed into a new day. The revolution of thought which has been wrought by modern science compels us to modify old and to discover new thought-forms. In this effort we are still in a rudimentary stage; and we have to attempt to state the essential truth of

the traditional doctrine in such thought-forms as are available to us. The Nicene Fathers knew nothing of organic evolution, emergents, events, potentials and the rest of our amazing modern vocabulary. But we have to speak in this tentative idiom.

And just as there was then, so there is today, a living issue involved and a real battle to be fought. If, then, the problem was to maintain the belief that a transcendent God stood in a living and intimate relation to His human creatures, the problem today is to save men from the bankruptcy which must follow the notion that there is no God but that which they may find in themselves. For if God be in us and only in us, there is an end of aspiration. With the end of aspiration, life will become static; and the divine purpose in the evolution of life will be thwarted. It is only the vivid sense of a transcendent destiny that can keep us on the move; and it is in the paradox of Jesus that we have the assurance that though God be in us, He is also beyond us, and that we have a far way to go.

IV

THE IMAGE OF GOD

1. The Living God

What Alexander calls "deity" and Lloyd Morgan calls "spirit" presumably correspond to what Athanasius called the "substance" of God. But these are terms which hide our ignorance rather than reveal our knowledge. It is, I think, necessary to make a distinction between the being or the substance of God and the *character* of God. By the being of God, I mean what God is in Himself; by His character, what He is in His relationships. Of the being of God we can say little or nothing with assurance, save only that we believe that He is. We speak of deity but we do not know what deity is. Deity is a word that we have invented to describe a category of life that is higher than that of the human person. We believe that such a category of life exists; but it is not within our grasp. Deity is a word which is at once a profession of faith and a confession of ignorance. It is not, to be sure, with reference to deity alone that we have to confess this ignorance. We do not even know what *life* is; we are

familiar with its manifestations and we can describe some of its processes, but what it is is still hidden from us. Nor has any one yet succeeded in defining *personality* in a fashion which commands general assent. All our knowledge of life and personality is that which we derive from their behaviour. We know them, that is, in their relationships, not in themselves.

And what we are really interested in knowing is the character of God; and this we should gather from the behaviour of God. "Certainly," admits Mr. H. G. Wells, "there is something beyond the individual that is and beyond the world that is." [1] But if that "something beyond" is alive in any sense, as we must surely presume it is, it must behave in some fashion; and from its behaviour we should be able to gather some information concerning its character. In the main, the information we shall gather is what may be known about God from His behaviour towards man, though that will have its bearing upon what other less direct information we may acquire concerning the ways of God, as for instance, from natural science.

But at the best, we shall have to be content with a view which from the nature of the case will be partial and provisional. This does not mean that our view will not be true so far as it goes; but only that it will be all that we can reach through our present inadequate faculties.

But there are one or two points bearing upon the

being of God on which something must be briefly said. Is God personal? No, says Mr. Wells. Emphatically not, says Mr. Julian Huxley. Mr. Wells and Mr. Huxley seem to have a grudge against personality. "The human spirit," says the former, "has learned love, devotion, obedience and humility in relation to other personalities, and with difficulty it takes the final step to a transcendent subordination from which the last shred of personality has been stripped." [2] But why should the universe have brought forth personality at all, if at the end it is to be dropped overboard in this wholesale way? Unless, indeed, that by this "transcendent subordination" some higher category of life is to emerge. But Mr. Wells does not tell us what is to take the place of personality. He speaks of a "world-revolution," which is evidently to receive the devotion which men have hitherto given to God. At the end of the revolution is the World-community. But a community of what? Obviously of persons; and so for all our "transcendent subordination," we are still tied to personality. It hardly seems worth while.

Nature which has in turn produced the atom, the organism, and the person cannot be on its way to anything that is less than personal. Nor can the ultimate Reality, which must somehow embrace personality, be less than personal. The discussion of this question however, can come to no satisfactory issue until we are agreed upon the property of personality. Professor

Macmurray insists that the peculiar property of personality is self-transcendence;[2] and for my own part, I have no difficulty in following Professor Macmurray's argument leading to the conception of Universal Personality. But it is idle to labour the point. If we believe that the property of personality is self-limitation and separateness, as Mr. Wells seems to think, we shall say that God is not personal. If we agree with Professor Macmurray and say that the property of personality is self-transcendence, then we shall say that if God exists, He must be personal. But when as a substitute for God there is offered to us a blue-print revolution or that bodiless quintessential abstraction that Mr. Huxley calls the Sacred Reality, I do not find it difficult to make my choice.

The real question, I think, is a simpler one. It is whether God is a living God. That something beyond the individual that is and the world that is, the existence of which Mr. Wells concedes, must at least be a living something. It is unthinkable that it should be inanimate. If it be inanimate and cannot have any interest in what is going on in the universe; and if, therefore, the end of everything is nescience, well, then, what is the good of anything? What in that case is the use of blue-prints for a world revolution? Or of a science of biology? Along this line lies the ultimate bankruptcy of aspiration and effort. What sustains the hope and energy of science and art, of thought and of all honest

work is the belief that this sum of things as a whole does mean something, that it has a meaning as a whole to some one who recognises it as a real meaning. For if it is not a meaning to some one, is it a meaning at all? And if the meaning is not there, there is no sense in science.

2. A Loving God

There is, we have seen, a certain transcendence and absoluteness in Jesus which constrains us to offer Him a unique devotion and which is only to be explained by supposing Him to be in some unique way the self-manifestation of God. God dramatised Himself in Jesus of Nazareth. In the "event" of Jesus in life and death, we descry the "behaviour" of God in its most manifest expression. Soon or late, in any serious study of the Christian event, a doctrine of incarnation appears to be inevitable. But the transcendence and absoluteness of Jesus is specially associated in our minds with His love, that love which, in the forgiveness of those who compassed His defeat and His death, was true to itself through everything; and it follows from this that the character of God, the aspect and behaviour of God towards His creatures, is to be described by the word *love.*

But the use of the word love involves us in some difficulty because of the wide variety of its uses, and especially of erotic and sentimental debasements of it.

If we trace the evolution of life from its first known beginnings, we shall find two principles at work, one a principle which manifests itself in the production of individual units of life, and another which gathers these units together and out of them brings forth a new, larger and more elaborate unit. To begin with, we have the single cell, like the amoeba; then we have the multicellular organism; and all the way upward we can find this interplay in various forms; we have it in the ant and the ant hill, the bee and the beehive, and at last we have the human individual and human society. Right through the whole effort and activity of life, these two principles are at work—the principle of individuation and the principle of association. Of the first, the highest term is the impulse towards freedom, and of the second, the impulse to love. These two belong organically to one another, for there is no perfect freedom except in the universe of love, and there is no love at all where there is no freedom. We are made free in order that we may love. And it may be demonstrated beyond a doubt that on this human plane love is the law and the prophets, and the gospel as well. Mr. Trotter in his book, *The Herd Instinct in Peace and War,* tells us "that Nature has been hinting to man through the incalculable ages of his existence as a social animal, that 'altruism' must become the ultimate sanction of his moral code." And altruism he defines as "the capacity to assimilate the interest of another

individual with one's own, to allow him, as it were, to partake in one's own personality"; and that may stand as a definition of what we are here calling love. It is an energy of integration which may express itself all the way from the smallest act of co-operation or of pity, through varying intensities of fellowship and friendship, to its highly specialised manifestations in the love of man and maid, and of parent and child.

But just as on the human plane love has a character different from the animal impulse of association, so we cannot suppose that human love is anything more than a faint analogy of the divine. Human love is still on the way to something higher than itself, and can do no more than "hint at its own absent perfection." It may be that if we could apprehend what love is in God, we might discover it to be in some way the very *being* of God; and that might, as Edward Caird has said, remove one large present difficulty in our thought of God. In one of his letters, he speaks (I am quoting from memory) of the difficulty of "uniting the conception of God as a self-determining principle manifesting Himself in a development which includes nature and man, with the conception of Him as being eternally perfect in Himself." And he goes on to suggest that if it could be clearly grasped and stated, the clue might be found in the conception of God as love, of *God as going beyond Himself in order to be Himself*. But, however that may be, we may conceive of the love of God as the determin-

ing element in His dealings with His world; and without undue tension of words or ideas, we may think of it as the abiding ground of the ultimate values, and say that Goodness is love in our mutual relationships, that Truth is love in thought, that Beauty is love in self-expression in whatever medium.

To say that God is love is, however, to say something which is both hard to believe and harder to conceive. It is hard to believe because of the presence of so much in the universe that is incongruous with love. This difficulty we will try to meet in the next chapter. The difficulty of conceiving God as love is the common difficulty of conceiving abstract ideas and qualities. Mark Rutherford says, somewhere, that our minds with their present furniture are incapable of conceiving "forever" adequately. "Directly we try to consider it, to follow it out, we feel distinctly a kind of break." And it is so under whatever form we endeavour to conceive the "infinite continuum" in which "all things consist." Professor Eddington speaks of the unknown content which runs through the universe and "which must surely be the stuff of our own consciousness." The remark has a warm and reassuring sound but, when one tries to sense its significance, it wholly escapes. One's mind fails to grasp it crisply and to put it in a communicable form. The philosopher may be able to leave it there, but the rest of us cannot. We may, as Sir Henry Jones has said, think of God as infinite, but we

cannot do with Him as indefinite. And infinite love is an idea too abstract for daily use.

Ernest Renan once said that the proper vehicle for philosophical ideas was the drama; and the true drama is always that. *Coriolanus* and *Julius Cæsar,* he says, are "not pictures of Roman customs but studies in an eternal psychology." I do not remember whether, in his *Vie de Jésus,* Renan points out how spontaneously and consistently the greatest of all religious teachers turned to the dramatic form in order to express his own intuitions and discoveries in the deep things of God. In our "high-brow" conceit we have been apt to think of the parables of Jesus as a mode of conveying spiritual truth to rude and primitive minds, assigning them tacitly to the same category as the old-fashioned "cautionary tales" that were told to children. "Truth embodied in a tale," we have quoted with a slight accent of condescension, "may enter in at lowly doors." But that we think and speak in that fashion only means that we have failed to grasp the parables. The Parable of the Prodigal Son is the dramatisation of the unyielding, yearning love of God for His wayward creatures; and it tells the mystery of our redemption as no disquisition on the atonement can. (It is interesting to note how frequently in grave, discursive theological exposition the atonement has been dramatised under the form of legal, judicial or commercial transaction.) The Parable of the Hidden Treasure is a dramatisation of that

critical experience in which a man breaks through the crust of sense and, in a high transfiguring moment, sees and grasps eternal reality and knows that life has no more to offer him. In a hundred living vignettes—the pearls before swine, the leaven in the meal, the obdurate judge, the unfinished tower, the fisher of men and the like—Jesus tells us truth that no discursive prose of however fine a texture could carry so convincingly. A dry-as-dust commentator will explain all this by saying that it is a habit of the Semitic mind; and none may read, say, Doughty's *Arabia Deserta,* without realising that the Semitic mind is indeed very rich in this faculty. But we err if we suppose it to be a gift inferior to our habit of ponderous prose. If Renan is right, it is a better gift than ours and, for speaking of the weightier matters of life, more fruitful.

3. The Father

So in our thought and speech of the divine love, we must needs dramatise it. God has indeed always been conceived under an image. Once it was a graven image; and it is still an image. God has been thought of as Judge, King, Shepherd, Architect, and the like; and Jesus thought and spoke consistently of God under the image of the Father, which is the simplest and most direct image under which a God of love can be domesticated in the mind of man. To be sure, the "Father" is the image in which I dramatise the character of God in

its bearing towards me and my like; and it takes no account of other aspects of God. But it is the image under which I can most appropriately conduct myself and my affairs in relation to God—that is to say, I treat Him as a Father. Unfortunately the image of the Father has never been held quite purely and singly by any age of men since Jesus; and a good deal of the obstruction to faith in our time is due to the ambiguous presentation of God caused by the distortion of the image of the Father by the survival of other images and ideas that have outlived their usefulness. We should agree that the idea of the *tribal* God was a necessary stage in the development of monotheism; but we should have said before the war that the tribal God was dead. It turned out, however, that there was little of the universal Father about the God of war time; and the degree in which the tribal God survived in Europe is the measure of the failure of Europe to apprehend the Father God.

But there are other distortions; for instance, there is the distortion of *size,* which may arise from a certain megalomania in human nature. The attention of children is easily commanded by an appeal to their interest in the superlative thing, the tallest mountain on earth, and the like. We are all apt to make too much of mere size. There are obvious reasons why in religion we should incline to superlatives and to super-superlatives. The language of devotion is full of a quantitative

adoration—omnipresent, omnipotent, omniscient, infinite—all of which seems to suggest that the important thing about God is His size. This is palpably the wrong place for the emphasis. For religion what is really important is not how big God is, but *what* He is, His nature and not His size. It is worth some attention that Jesus never "talks big" about God. "With God nothing is impossible," is the furthest that He allowed Himself to go; and that saying has to be balanced by another like it: "And nothing shall be impossible unto you." Obviously the Christian view of God is qualitative rather than quantitative.

Then there is the political distortion, the portrayal of God under the image of a secular sovereign. This goes back a long way, of course; and in its young days it had its uses. It was Calvin who fastened it upon Protestantism by his doctrine of the sovereignty of God. This he inherited directly from the Middle Ages, when God was inferred from His vicar, the Pope, who ruled an ecclesiastical empire by the most approved methods of secular statecraft. This was a God whose nature was power, whose method was coercion and whose aim was the goosestep. But the Papacy made the mistake of leaving the New Testament about; for it contained news of another kind of God—whose nature was love, whose instrument was grace and whose method was conversion and persuasion. It was the difference between a God of Authority and a God of Freedom; and it was

this contradiction that lay at the back of the movement which culminated in the Reformation. But strangely, the contradiction survived in Protestantism; and the conventional God of the Protestant confession has been a sort of half-despot, half-father. There is, however, no way of combining these two images in a single picture. You cannot reconcile the God of the truncheon with the God of the Cross.

There is also the static distortion of God—the God of immutable law, of "foreknowledge absolute," whose dispositions were finally made in eternity and are not subject to change, a God bound by His own decrees, detached from the world and unable to share its life. This distortion is already little more than a clinging survival; for biology has compelled us to connect the idea of organic process with our thought of deity. The God of speculative philosophy might be the architect, the mechanician, the engineer, the artificer; but the God of biology is Himself somehow involved in the process of life. From this, two consequences have already followed. The first is a steady decline of the belief in a thaumaturgic God, the God of signs and wonders, of magic and sleight-of-hand, and in its stead a growing sense of God as unfolding and fulfiling Himself in the normal processes of life and history.

This was, indeed, the God with which Protestantism entered the nineteenth century. He was a God superficially universal but subcutaneously tribal, a glorified

despot clad in a suit of Christian graces, absolute in power but palpably inadequate in achievement, transcendental and distant despite His presumptive Fatherhood, revealing himself in the occasional wonder of the abnormal rather than in the greater marvel of the normal. This was a conception of God that stood no chance of survival in a scientific age. It cancelled out at too many points. When the realism of the scientific method touched it, it crumpled up; and the natural consequence was that men turning away from this kind of God supposed themselves bereft of God altogether. The phase of agnosticism and rationalism was inevitable. But whatever the agnostics themselves thought they were out to do, it is now becoming clear that they were the agents of a discipline by which faith was to be purged of credulity, and religion like everything else had to come to terms with the scientific method, wherever that method was legitimately applicable within the province of religion.

But the image of the Father is, as Jesus Himself has hinted, inadequate. The best fatherhood we know is but a pale suggestion of the divine. "If ye, being evil, know how to give good gifts unto your children, how much more your heavenly Father." Fatherhood is an image which suggests origination and affection, providence and protection. But it is notorious that it does not cover the whole ground of the human need and experience of God. Sometimes one meets a suggestion

that a doctrine of divine motherhood is needed to supplement that of the divine fatherhood. It is possible that the place of the Virgin in the Roman system corresponds to the same feeling. It is not without some significance that the simple religious consciousness has given to man a Father and to God a mother. Perhaps our wisdom lies not in holding one or two authoritative images but in using in its turn any image that may fitly set forth the everlasting love. Some of these are already to our hand in the New Testament: the Shepherd who goes in search of the lost sheep, the Lord of the Harvest; and Francis Thompson in his image of "The Hound of Heaven" has taught us how far a dedicated imagination may travel in order to find a vivid image of the pursuit of the soul by the divine love. On the whole, those images are likely to be truer which reflect a relationship within the sphere of life, though one may not deny the elements of Truth in such an image as that of the "Architect of the Universe."

But when I come to define for myself what satisfies my sense of the fullest truth that I can know of God, I inevitably come at last to the figure of Jesus Himself. For He is Himself Love incarnate. In spite of His fragmentary history He is to me to be the fullest expression that I know, and within the limits of human nature and of human apprehension the fullest that I can conceive, of that "self-determining principle which manifests itself in a development which includes nature

and man." At last, then, for me, God is Jesus writ large. In Jesus, God was stating Himself to the man in the street. And though this leaves me with questions still unanswered, I find by acting as man and minister upon this view that I have a gospel which turns out to be essentially true to the nature of things.

Anthropomorphism? No doubt. But why may not I be anthropomorphic here when we are all anthropomorphic in our thinking outside of mathematics? As Dr. Aveling has recently pointed out, "the first steps in science are taken, and the ground prepared for causal explanation" by a process in which we set our individual selves up as measures for the classification of other objects according to their difference from and similarity to us.[5] Our data come to us in a human experience and are digested by human minds; and (even by mechanists and behaviourists) the conclusions are cast in human moulds. Even when our thinking reaches the unearthly plane of abstract symbols, even these are human inventions. And our machines are anthropomorphic. For what is any machine but an extension or an elaboration of some human faculty? Our thinking is, inevitably, shot through and through with anthropomorphism. And if I believe that there is a God, why should I be charged with intellectual sin when I conceive Him in terms of the highest—and indeed the only—category of life that I have any immediate knowledge of, that of personality? It does not at all follow that I suppose

that the human image under which I conceive God comprehends the whole truth of God. I know that at best it is only an approximation to the truth: but it is the best that I, being what I am, can do.

V

DISHARMONY

I SAID in the last lecture that one of the difficulties in the way of conceiving God as love is the existence in the universe of much that on the face of it looks incongruous with such a view. This is a difficult subject; and it may as well be admitted, soon as late, that to some of the questions involved there is no final answer in sight. Perhaps when our knowledge is fuller than it is today the answer will reveal itself. But, as things are, any realistic scrutiny of the problem leaves us with a tough residuum of mystery on our hands; and at that point the only possible attitude for an honest mind is one of reverent but provisional agnosticism. After a discussion of the disharmonies and other shadows in the world of animate nature, Professor J. A. Thomson remarks that it is significant that they tend to disappear in the light of increasing knowledge;[1] and it is a reasonable hope that increasing knowledge on the human plane may take the sting out of a thousand seemingly cruel anomalies.

The disharmony which we find in the universe presents itself under two broad aspects—the one being the

existence of pain and suffering, and the other, the existence of moral evil or sin. But though these two aspects are capable of being comprehended under the heading of disharmony, and are usually much entangled in each other in actual life, they constitute two different problems and call for separate discussion. Within the limits of a brief course of lectures it is impossible to treat the subject with the fullness that it requires; but we cannot pass it by. For it constitutes the main challenge to the view of the character of God to which our argument has so far led us. We shall have to omit, since our scope is so circumscribed, the question of pain and suffering in the world of life below the human level; even then, our treatment of what remains after this omission will inevitably be slender and cursory.

1. Pain and Suffering

If God is love, why do we find pain and suffering in the world?

I would like to observe, to begin with, that it is stupid to suppose that the infliction of pain and suffering is necessarily incongruous with love. There is in our common human experience such a thing as being cruel in order to be kind; and there is a sort of kindness which is itself a failure of love. In a universe governed by love, it is easily conceivable that there may be beneficent pain and suffering; and there quite obviously is. But when we have allowed for that, and for that consider-

able volume of imaginary pain for which people are very ready to blame God, there still remains a great deal of suffering in the world which it is difficult to reconcile with a purpose of love. Even if there be no failure of love, there seems to be something like a failure of management. Our first duty is to try to see the problem in its proper dimensions.

In the economy of the Universe two broad facts must be observed. The first is *human freedom.* A strong, theoretical case can be made for determinism; but I have never yet known a determinist or a behaviourist who did not assume that *he* himself was free and who did not act accordingly. Here freedom means simply the possession of capacity and power to make choices, and we habitually assume that we have that power. And we are free apparently because we are meant to be persons and not pawns, "helpless pieces of the game He plays." Freedom implies independence, individuality—it makes possible grace and nobility of conduct, and, at its highest, a certain impulse towards creation. But obviously freedom to create is also freedom to destroy, the freedom to be a saint is also the freedom to be a scoundrel. God (if the figure be allowed) in leaving man free was taking a great risk, but he was playing for a very great stake. It may be true that our natural endowment of freedom is very limited; and indeed it is still further limited by our own acts continually no less than by the entail of the acts of our

forebears; but for all that, it is evidently a great deal more than most of us know how to use wisely.

The second fact is a certain *principle of continuity.* To this there are two aspects. One is our *human solidarity.* Each one of us is a ganglion in a nervous system which is as enduring as time, and as wide as the world. Today this is more intensely so than it has ever been; the world is a precinct, and the ends of the earth are at the end of the street. An influenza microbe of a new type is bred in the filth of a central Asian village and it kills its hundreds of thousands in America. A murder in an outlandish little town in Europe plunges the whole world into a murderous war.

The second aspect of this continuity is what we may for lack of a better name call "moral causality"—the process by which a man comes to reap what he sows, which links the sowing of evil to the harvest of tragedy.

But neither aspect of this principle of continuity has an inherent moral colour. Both are ethically colourless. Their moral results depend upon the material that is put in them; and it must be insisted that they make for the succession and the increase of good as readily as they do for evil. Human solidarity distributes blessing as it distributes tragedy. What we have here is, as it were, a piece of machinery. If you choose to put in it shoddy raw material, you will get shoddy products. And if the machine turns out pain

and sorrow, the inference is surely plain. It turns out what in the exercise of our freedom we have chosen to put in.

So far as man in the mass is concerned, it is possible out of these circumstances to weave a doctrine of providence which is satisfying enough. These principles of freedom, solidarity and moral causality are organs of race education; and the way in which men's actions work out under these conditions should at least teach men the difference between right and wrong and incline them to choose good rather than evil. It is evidently ordained that we shall learn through our burned fingers and broken hearts the things that belong to our peace. And though we have had lessons sharp enough, we are woefully slow to understand.

This view, however, does not cover the case of the individual. Why should the cost of the education of the race fall so heavily upon the individual? I admit at once that I have no satisfying answer to give. I do not know why the individual should be sacrificed for the education of the race, for the race has no meaning apart from the individuals that constitute it. I cannot even guess why the babies of Europe should have to pay the price of the crimes and follies of a godless imperialism, a dishonest diplomacy and a stupid statecraft.

All the same, I am not, because there is a gap in my thought at this point, going to throw away the rest.

I profess, as I said, a provisional agnosticism at this point, and am prepared to wait for more data than I have at the moment before I reach a final conclusion. Meantime, however, I note some circumstances that mitigate the harshness of the dilemma.

First, there is at least a partial law of compensation in life. The person who is deprived of sight develops a peculiar sensitiveness of touch. I remember years ago reading two medical books on infant mortality, and in both of them the same sentence occurred: *Nature is always on the side of the child.* Nature provides a real prospect even for the ill-born child, if it gets reasonable care after birth. It is out of the observation of certain facts of this kind that we have got the saying that with the bane nature provides the antidote. Nevertheless, we cannot pretend, in the present stage of our knowledge, that this principle of compensation is universal.

Second, there is a provision by which material and physical evil may become the means of spiritual advantage. Many a man has achieved a peculiar grace of life as the result of a physical handicap; and there have been plenty of cases where personal tragedy has become the cornerstone of high achievement. But here again we must admit that the compensation is apparently neither complete nor universal.

Yet concerning these matters, it is not unfair to suggest that compensation for human ills might be a good

deal more extensive were it not for "man's inhumanity to man."

Third, there is the possibility of immortality. I say *possibility,* not because I think it only a possibility, but simply because I am trying to keep within the limits of the present argument. I think that there are better grounds for believing in immortality than for disbelieving in it. It is no objection to immortality that (as Mr. Wells says somewhere) the craving for it is a form of egoism. That is equally an objection to the craving for freedom. And I believe that at bottom the craving for immortality is the craving for perfect freedom. In any case, at the lowest, it is a fair presumption from the facts of life as we know them that the human soul does not derive its life or its peculiar quality from perishable matter, and that the dissolution of the body is not necessarily the extinction of the soul.

So that I think that there are possibilities of a very considerable kind which go far to modify the harshness of the case of the individual. But there is another fact to be remembered in this connection. Quite apart from immortality, have we all the data at hand for a final view of this matter, and are the data that we have set out in a sound proportion? Tragedy is always spectacular, dramatic; it catches the eye, and while it is upon us it fills the stage. Consequently it may receive a disproportionate place in our view of things. Peace is quiet, uneventful, undramatic, it calls no attention to

itself. I would not minimize the tragedy of the great war; but vast as the destruction and sorrow were that it wrought, we may not forget its strange, beautiful heroisms, its brave endurances, its lovely idealisms, and all that this means of hope and reassurance for the race. And for all the years before it and in the many years to come, despite social injustices without number, men have gone on and will go on enjoying the peace of home, the joy of loving and being loved, the satisfactions of work well done—in the mass, an immeasurable volume of well-being, of which in the long tale of the years the war will count for no more than a passing interruption. The unseen love, the unreported joy, the peace that passeth the notice of the newspaper, the daily and hourly satisfactions of friendship and good work, these things that fill the common unheeded ways of life and which blossom through and after sorrow and calamity, just as fields of France which ten years ago were bleak and bare, save for the signs of death and destruction, were this year covered with green and grain—all this we must include in our accounting.

Finally, it may be recalled that, in the view of Jesus, the presence of pain in the world was not a theological nut to crack but a call to action. He offers no explanation of the misfortune of the man born blind. To Him the man presented himself not as a problem, but as a patient. And it has been of enormous advantage to the race that it has been able to look at pain and suffer-

ing in this light, not as a puzzle or as a topic, but as a challenge. For out of this has grown our amazing modern medical science and our wide humanitarian activity. And this view rests upon the conviction that suffering and pain are not necessarily permanent elements of life. They are incidental disorders and are removable. And the effort to remove them has brought untold spiritual and moral riches to mankind.

I suggested that if the presence of pain and suffering in the world did not necessarily show a failure of love, it might indicate a failure of management. But whose failure? Plainly a good deal of the disharmony in the universe is directly traceable to our human failure; for what God meant for our advantage, we have used to our detriment. But this does not cover all the facts; and it has to be admitted that our argument so far can hardly be said to do more than show cause why we should not hastily renounce our faith in the friendliness of God. We do not yet know all the facts in the case; but the facts that we do know justify us in waiting for more before we reach a final judgement.

2. The Fall of Man

We now come to the problem of moral evil, that dark aspect of life which we embrace in the term "sin."

Sin has not for some time been a fashionable topic. This is partly due to our superstitious surrender to the Spencerian doctrine of fated progress. "Always

towards perfection," cried Spencer in an ecstatic moment, "is the mighty movement." On this view sin seems no more than an infantile disease which the race will outgrow in the course of its continued evolution. This view, while it lasted, consorted well with the inclinations of the average man. Since we are still in process of development and are gradually outgrowing this distemper, why bother about it? Sir Oliver Lodge, a few years ago, expressed the opinion that "the higher man of today was not bothering about his sins." Whoever or whatever this "higher man of today" might have been, he had no monopoly of this temper. This light-hearted mood had affected most of us; and in pre-war days few of us were thinking seriously about sin. I attended a conference of churchmen in the year before the war in which a whole morning was spent in discussing the function of the church; and not once during the discussion did the word or the idea of sin emerge. I do not know that our more theological grandfathers liked thinking about sin any more than we do. But they were more realistic than we are, and they thought a great deal about sin. Perhaps they overdid it; and that may be why we do it so little. That, however, is our misfortune, and our very great peril. Not indeed that we should think of it in the same terms as our grandfathers. But it is simply idiotic and fatal to think that we need not think of it at all. The sense of sin in one form or another has pursued

the human soul through all its known history: and it reflects so important a volume of observation and experience of life than no man or school can neglect it and still expect to be taken seriously. The persistent human sense of moral accountability, and the *sequelæ* of man's moral failure in such universal emotions as penitence, remorse, contrition, self-loathing, constitute too massive a datum in the study of man to be ignored by any student who would profess himself a realist in the interpretation of life. Somewhere in this region is the spring of the vast never-concluded tragedy of man, and our present business is to recover the basis of fact upon which the sense of sin rests and to state it congruously with current knowledge. The central moral problem of mankind today is what it has ever been, to find a cure for what Lord Morley justly called "that horrid burden and impediment in the soul which the Churches call *sin,* and which, by whatever name you call it, is a real catastrophe in the moral nature of man."

Concerning the origin of human sin we cannot perhaps say much that is profitable. The story of the Fall is an imaginative rather than a historical explanation of the presence of sin in the world. It has been somewhat the fashion to propound a biological theory of sin as the residual carry-over of "the ape and tiger." But the view of natural selection on which this theory rested is now hardly tenable in its old form. The

struggle for existence is not the only factor in the evolution of life; the impulse towards co-operation and mutual aid has also played a critical part in the process. And if man has inherited the one, he has no less inherited the other. Our social instinct is no less a part of our natural inheritance than are our self-regarding instincts. On this view we have original righteousness as well as original sin. It is clear that we must look elsewhere for the origin of sin.

It is worth observing that there is a modern tendency towards a view which may yet rehabilitate the doctrine of the fall, not indeed in the form of the Scriptural story, but in its substance. The doctrine of the fall has fallen on evil days because it seemed incongruous with a doctrine of evolution. But that conclusion was derived from a faulty conception of the process of evolution.

Evidence has been growing since Darwin's time that suggests that evolution has proceeded by a series of what look like "jumps," for which there appears to be no sufficient explanation. There are great blanks in the story and there is nothing to fill them up with. For instance, in the evolution of the brain, both of men and other mammals, there have been sudden leaps which biological science is at a loss to explain. This does not mean that there has been any actual discontinuity in the process, but that at some points there have been inexplicable accelerations of the process.

Further, we now know that evolution is not inevitable. Degeneration is as much a fact of nature as development. The movement is not always upward. Sometimes it stops. Sometimes it goes downward. Bergson speaks of a sort of drag which is always working against growth. "The evolution of the animal kingdom has always been retarded or stopped or dragged back by the tendency it has kept towards the vegetative life. However full, however overflowing the activity of an animal species may be, torpor and unconsciousness are lying in wait for it." [3] There is no evidence that the movement of life is necessarily progressive. As far as man is concerned, let a biologist speak: "To be chastised out of our minds is the smug conceit that all evolutionary change, especially that in which man is concerned, is *ipso facto* progressive." [4]

What it comes to is this: if there are "jumps" in the process of evolution, there seems to be no reason why there should not be "falls." J. A. Thomson virtually tells us that tapeworms are a fallen form of life.[5] Evidence seems to be accumulating that man has not merely fallen once but has fallen again and again. Here is an anthropologist who tells us, after a study of various tools and implements left behind them by the men of the Old Stone Age, that they "do not seem to have been very concerned with combat. They do not appear to have made weapons of stone. They may, of course,

have made them of wood. But it is hardly likely that, since they were such masters of stone-working, that they would have failed to make serviceable weapons for combat if they needed them." After adducing other evidence, he concludes that there is "no other interpretation of the facts" than that there was once "a golden age of peace, when violence was absent from human relationships." [6] There is another anthropologist who tells us that among primitive peoples there is "a group-sentiment which makes unnecessary any definite machinery for the exertion of authority" (that is, they have no law or police), "in the same manner as it makes possible the harmonious working of communal ownership." [7] Plainly, civilised man has had some kind of a fall, for he is grievously at odds with his community. Yet a third anthropologist has news of another fall. You know what we mean when we talk about "caveman stuff." For us the caveman is a symbol of barbarity. But we are probably quite wrong about that. The one thing, as Mr. Chesterton has said, and as we have already seen, that we do quite surely know about the caveman is that he drew some rather wonderful pictures on the walls of his cave. This phase of primitive art lasted from about 10000 B.C. to 6500 B.C., that is, almost to the dawn of history; and our anthropologist speaks of this art, "which rose at the first to the finest style of cave-art" (another jump, you see) "then grew careless, degenerated, and finally

collapsed with great suddenness at the end of the period." [8] Another fall, obviously.

So it is a world of "jumps" and "falls." The Genesis story is probably a surviving race-memory of a moment when mankind or some part of it took a wrong turning. The Garden of Eden may be a survival in tradition of some primeval state of happiness which man forfeited by being untrue to the purpose that God had written into his being. What anthropology has to say about man's falls coheres with what history and our own wits tell us about the present condition of man. When we survey the historical human scene, the vanity and frustration of human effort, the chaos and confusion in which man's waywardness has engulfed him, the pain and sorrow and tragedy that overhangs human life; and when we trace the ancestry of our contemporary trouble back through the ages of history and see the tenacity with which some malign demon of fatality has clung to the skirts of mankind, it becomes difficult to resist Newman's conclusion that somehow, somewhere, the race was involved in "a terrible aboriginal catastrophe."

But observe that the corollary of the doctrine of the fall is that sin is not a permanent feature of life. It is an intruder, and it is possible to eject it from the world. It is an undesirable stranger that should be shown to the door. "The Fall," says Mr. Chesterton, "is a view of life. It is not only the only enlightening

but the only encouraging view of life. It holds, as against the only real alternative philosophies, those of the Buddhist or the Pessimist or the Promethean, that we have misused a good world, and not merely been entrapped into a bad one. It refers evil back to the wrong use of the will, and thus declares that it can eventually be righted by the right use of the will. Every other creed except that one is some form of surrender to fate. A man who holds this view of life will find it giving light on a thousand things; on which mere evolutionary ethics have not a word to say. For instance, on the colossal contrast between the completeness of man's machines and the continued corruption of his motives; on the fact that no social progress really seems to leave self behind; on the fact that the first and not the last men of any school or revolution are generally the best and purest; as William Penn was better than a Quaker millionaire or Washington better than an American oil magnate; on that proverb that says 'The price of liberty is eternal vigilance,' which is only what the theologians say of every other virtue, and is itself only a way of stating the truth of original sin; on those extremes of good and evil by which man exceeds all the animals by the measure of heaven and hell; on that sublime sense of loss that is in the very soul of all great poetry, and nowhere more than in the poetry of pagans and sceptics, 'We look before and after, and pine for what is not'; which

cries against all prigs and progressives out of the very depths and abysses of the broken heart of man, that happiness is not only a hope, but also in some strange manner a memory; and that we are all kings in exile." [9] And herein lies at once both our human shame and our hope.

3. The Nature of Sin

The ground of sin is the liability to degeneration which seems to be present in all forms of life; and by degeneration we mean a relapse towards a lower condition than that to which the organism has reached or may reach. "It must be noted," says Professor Whitehead, "that the state of degradation to which evil leads, when accomplished, is not in itself evil, except in comparison with what might have been. A hog is not an evil beast; but when man is degraded to the level of a hog, with the accompanying atrophy of finer elements, he is no more evil than a hog. The evil of final degradation lies in the comparison of what is with what might have been." [10] On the one side, sin partakes of the nature of a fall or of a backsliding; on the other, it is failure to rise to a higher possible level. It is well to remember that there is a good which may be sin. Whittier saw that:

> Suffice it, if my good and ill unreckoned,
> And *both* forgiven by Thine abounding grace. . . .

"Good people of narrow sympathies," says Whitehead

again, "are apt to be unfeeling and unprogressive, enjoying their egotistical goodness. Their case on a higher level is analogous to that of the man completely degraded to a hog. They have reached a state of stable goodness, so far as their own inner life is concerned. This type of moral certitude is, on a larger view, so like evil that the distinction is trivial." [11] To put it in an evangelical idiom, some people need to be saved from a standardised morality just as others need to be saved from drunkenness.

We may say that original sin is a predisposition to backsliding and an indisposition to advance. Sin itself is the activity of this bias. We are speaking now in a biological idiom; later on, we shall have to use another idiom in order to reach the whole truth of the matter. Meantime we are conceiving of man as a being having living possibilities of moral growth and spiritual development; and his failure in whatever fashion to endeavour to realise those possibilities constitutes sin. These facts of potential advance and potential backsliding exist on every plane; but the emergence of man imposes on them a different character. On the lower plane, they are facts of nature which so far as we can see are morally colourless. We call them good or evil because we interpret them in terms of human moral values. But *actually,* on the human plane, they are good or evil.

They are actually good or evil on the human plane

by reason of two circumstances which we have already had occasion to note in other connections. The first is the moral consciousness in man, his instinctive sense (however acquired) of a difference between good and evil. The second is the fact of human freedom; and it is this that invests human actions with a moral character. What measure of freedom exists on the different planes of sub-human life we do not know; and the measure of human freedom may be much narrower than in our human conceit we are apt to suppose. But however narrow it may be, it is enough to lead a modern biologist to say that "human evolution has been turned over to humankind to direct." [12] This is the crucial fact about man which separates him from the rest of his living kin. Mr. R. Ellis Roberts tells us that at some point in the world's history, "that which we now call man separated himself from the course of life, or perhaps it would be better to say that at one moment one man realised that such a separation was possible, and if possible, it must become his one definite aspiration, the aim of all effort and all conscious desire." "Until that certain and difficult discovery of his destiny, man was as the stones and the trees, material for life,—a form fantastic, weak, occasionally decorative, with which life made patterns on our earth. Since that time, any naked baby whimpering and puling, feeble and foolish, is of more importance, of greater significance than the might of mountains, the flow and

force of rivers, the unceasing, orderly disorder of ocean, the far spectacle of the planetary system or the whole conceivable universe: *life has become material for man.*" [13] This is a graphic way of affirming the independence and the freedom of man. And Mr. Ellis Roberts identifies the inclination to slip back into the course of natural life with what the theologians call sin. It is within our power to further or to arrest whatever purpose may be involved in this momentous ascent; and sin is wilful refusal to carry on or the wilful consent to fall back. "Sin," says Professor J. Y. Simpson, "is failure to continue to win freedom, an acceptance of dynamic equilibrium, definite acceptance of the purpose of life, treason to the purpose of the process. . . . It is the rebellious refusal to progress, acceptance of the present." [14] Sin, at bottom, is resistance to the movement of life.

Let me pause here to observe that this view of sin requires a change in our mental picture of it. In the New Testament, the two most important words for sin are ἁμαρτία and παράβασις; and both of them are pictures. The first is a picture of a man missing a mark; the second is a picture of a man crossing a line. In either case it is implied that there is a fixed standard or code of goodness. This has generally been identified with the Mosaic Law; and some Christian folk have found a superior code where they were never meant to find a code at all—in the Sermon on the Mount.

But the code, whether the one or the other, is conceived as fixed and absolute. But this notion of fixed codes belongs to a world of thought which has passed away; and today we are thinking in terms of *process*. We have not to do with a fixed mark or a fixed line. The new picture of sin is not that of a man missing a mark or breaking bounds. It is rather of a man holding up the traffic.

But wherein does a man hold up the traffic? What does sin actually consist in? In what kind of behaviour is it present? We may approach the answer to this question from more than one standpoint.

(1) From the biological point of view, we should say that it consists in all behaviour which hinders the actual process of life. Here I will only summarise the matter briefly; I have dwelt on it at some length elsewhere. Two coefficient principles have been at work in the evolutionary process—a principle of *individuation* and a principle of *integration*. All along the way, life has brought forth individual units of life, and then gathered these units into groups and created out of them new more elaborate units of life. There is the cell and the multicellular organism, the bee and the hive, the ant and the ant hill, the wolf and the pack and so on, until there is at last the human individual and the human society. Sin is therefore involved in any behaviour which hinders the growth of the human

individual or the evolution of the human society. It is no doubt true that the human individual is much in advance of his society; but that does not in any way invalidate this view; only, to be sure, it would appear to lay a certain additional gravity upon those sins that hinder the evolution of the true human society. A sharp line cannot be drawn between the individual and his society as though the achievement of the perfect man were contingent upon the coming of the perfect society, or vice versa. Both are mutually involved in the same organic process. The great soul and the great society will arrive together.

We may therefore classify the actions and inactions that constitute biological sin in this fashion:

(a) The offences of the individual against himself, e.g. self-indulgence, culpable ignorance, indolence, pride, the closed mind.

(b) The offences of the individual against society, e.g. tyranny, mendacity, the predatory exploitation of the group. But plainly we have also to add

(c) The offences of the society against the individual, e.g. all forms of regimentation, standardisation, persecution of the dissenter.

(d) The offences of the society against itself, e.g. its refusal to enlighten its members, or to remedy public or corporate abuses.

Obviously there can be no absolute frontier-lines here. The individual who offends against himself is *ipso facto* impoverishing the group; the society which maltreats the individual injures itself; and there is always individual responsibility for corporate sin.

> The sins that you do in two by two
> You must answer for one by one.

(2) We may say also that those modes of behaviour have the character of sin which deny or despise the "ultimate values." We here take the ultimate values, the good, the true, the beautiful, as indicating the goal in time of the march of life. Because of the predominantly moralistic background of Christianity, we have tended to identify sin exclusively with the offence against goodness, though we have not always been very clear-headed about the Christian idea of goodness. But it is no less necessary to identify sin with the offence against truth and the offence against beauty. We are somewhat apt to forget that a definite moral quality inheres in the failures and the contumacies of the intellect. The search for truth is as much integral to the process of life as is the endeavour after virtue. J. W. N. Sullivan in his book *Aspects of Science* speaks of the failure of scientific men to carry the discipline of the scientific method into other departments of life: "We want scientific men to regard their ideal of evidence, their conception of proof, their really admirable

scientific detachment, not merely as rules making for success in their particular game but as principles applicable to every subject that concerns a citizen. Why should a man of science be merely a Liberal or a Conservative in politics? . . . We expect a more sober contribution to political questions from, say, a distinguished physicist, than the panacea 'shoot the miners!' All the questions on which scientific men now adopt 'sides' as uncritically as any dupe of the daily press are amenable to scientific investigation. How long are these vital matters to remain in the hands of the witch doctors? With scientific men content to sit in the circle and help beat the tom-toms, what is there of real advance founded on real knowledge?" [15] The failure of the scientific man to be scientific in all his contacts with life is plainly an offence against truth and must be regarded as sin. It is a moral obligation to be intelligent. For a man who is not born mentally defective, it is a sin to be stupid. Similarly, all offences against beauty are sin. The prostitution of art to mean ends, to serve the purposes of avarice or sensuality, the artists' fall from the ideal of art to the baseness of trading in it, the disfiguration, by mere vandalism or by aggressive commercialism, of beautiful places and noble buildings —all these things count as sin.

(3) I have just said that we have not been very clear in our minds upon what constitutes goodness in the Christian sense. To be sure, we have the teaching of

Jesus ever before us; but we have got into the way of excusing ourselves from it by the silly old lie that it is impracticable. Upon this matter this is not the place to enlarge. But it is pertinent to observe that the whole teaching of Jesus springs from twin roots. We saw that the victory of Jesus consisted in his invincible faith and in his undefeated love; and in that circumstance we discerned the essential values of human personality. They are *faith* and *love,* and of these two principles the whole teaching of Jesus is a development. Here again then we have light upon the content of sin. Any failure of faith and love is sin. The unbelief that becomes cynicism or fear or despair, the lovelessness that becomes "envy and malice and all uncharitableness," that breeds hatred and unforgivingness —here once more we have behaviour that involves sin.

I have dwelt upon this matter at so great length because I feel it to be of very great importance that we should realise the extent and the gravity of the disharmony of moral evil. The levity with which we have in the recent past thought of sin involves us in real peril: and without some better understanding than we have of the present actuality of moral evil in the world, we shall not be able to attack our bristling modern difficulties with the necessary realism. Nothing is indeed so much needed in the business of saving this

human world from the ruin that threatens it than a deep momentous appreciation of the forces of degeneration and decay.

I have said nothing yet in answer to the question: But why is there moral evil in the world at all? The answer has, however, been implied in one or two places. Moral evil is the result of our misuse of freedom. But why then were we made free? The answer appears to be that the Power which ordained us desired that we should be men and women and not machines. And that, presumably, because the Power desired that we should be able to enter into free unconstrained relations to Himself. There is, so far as I can see, no real meaning in our freedom apart from God. But it has the most glorious meaning for us, if we can believe that God made us free in order that we might love Him. For there is no love where there is no freedom. A machine cannot love. Why God should desire Me to love Him, I cannot tell. But I can imagine nothing less than that which is sufficient to explain the miracle of my freedom. It is conceivable that God might have conducted the universe and the evolution of life on lines which would have won the approval of the most unbending mechanist. It would no doubt be a much tidier universe than it is, but also a much colder one. There would be no love in it. But God chose that there should be love in it, and so he made us free.

But freedom is a two-edged sword. It cuts both ways. And the moral disharmony of the world springs from the fact that we in the exercise of our freedom have gone astray. "We have turned each one to his own way." But God has not left it at that.

VI

ATONEMENT

1. Nature and Moral Evil

Lloyd Morgan says that there are two stories to be told of every vital process, a physical story and a psychical. We may adapt the principle of the two stories to our present purpose, and say that concerning any specific act or body of conduct there are two stories to be told, a biological and a theological.

The biological story of sin has already been told in part. Moral evil in this connection is resistance to the upward effort of life, expressing itself in various modes of behaviour, all of which have the common character of holding up the traffic of life. The remainder of the story is somewhat ambiguous. On the one side, it would appear that sin on the plane of nature works out its consequences to the end. There is, as we have before discerned, a principle of moral continuity in the nature of things that provides that a man shall reap what he has sown, that links sin and calamity in inevitable succession. "In the necessities of the hour," says Emerson, speaking of the fathers of the American Republic and their permission of negro slavery, "they

overlooked the moral law and winked at a practical exception to the Bill of Rights they had drawn up. They winked at the exception, believing it insignificant. But the moral law, the nature of things, did not wink at it, but kept its eye wide open. It turned out that this one violation was a subtle poison, which in eighty years corrupted the whole overgrown body politic and brought the alternative of extirpation of the poison or of ruin to the republic." [1] In what way so ever a man or a society offends, nature exacts the uttermost farthing, even if it has to continue its exactions to the third and fourth generations.

> The moving finger writes, and having writ,
> Moves on; not all your piety or wit
> Can lure it back to cancel half a line
> Nor all your tears wash out a word of it.

This does not indeed mean that nature inflicts "eternal punishment." A time comes when the curse is lifted. The entail is allowed to work itself out. Just as a disease has to run its course, so the consequences of wrongdoing have likewise to run their course. It is true that there are conditions under which the consequences of sin are changed in character and may be turned into means of grace. But from the consequences there is no remission. Nature cannot forgive sin.

Of course it is foolish to think of nature *punishing* in our sense of punishing. The principle of moral continuity works, as it were, of itself, linking moral causes

to their appropriate effects. But there is no specific machinery of punishment. On the sub-human plane, those animal species which fail to serve the purpose of life are discarded and left to reap the consequences of their failure, some to degenerate, some to perish and become extinct, others to remain in a prison of stagnation, while nature passes on in other forms of life that are more amenable to its designs. It is even so on the human plane. Nature leaves the man to "dree his weird"; the offence is suffered to bear its own characteristic fruit. And this is true whether the sin be of the mind or of the body.

But these generalisations are subject to a great deal of qualification. It may be true that nature does not forgive; but it is also certain that nature may relent. There is a *vis medicatrix naturæ.* Nature is paradoxical. In more than one kind of snake, the gall-bladder carries a sure antidote to the snake's venom.[2] Sir Arthur Quiller-Couch, in one of his essays, discusses side by side two great English novels, Thomas Hardy's *Tess of the D'Urbervilles* and George Moore's *Esther Waters.* In both these stories is a woman, a sinner, yet more sinned against than sinning. Hardy's Tess goes under; Moore's Esther wins out, is saved so as by fire. And the critic's conclusion is that of the two stories Moore's is the truer to life; for however heavily the odds may be against you, this is a universe in which, if you put up a brave fight, you have a chance of vic-

tory. To that I think we would all agree. But in this region we have still much to learn. How and in what proportions judgement and mercy are mingled in nature we cannot tell; but we may be certain that judgement and mercy are there.

2. God and Sin

We pass on now to the theological story of sin.

The answer of God to sin is forgiveness. This is the core and the distinction of the Christian "good news." But we have not even yet grown accustomed to it. It is qualified in our minds by an old notion that in the first instance God's reaction to sin is analogous to our reaction to breaches of "law and order"; and that therefore forgiveness is even to God a difficult second thought. There is something in us which seems to require us to think of God as being severe and iron-handed; perhaps it is the need to justify our own undoubted liking for being severe and iron-handed towards those who offend against the mores of our particular herd. I am aware, of course, that there are passages in the New Testament in which a certain hardness and severity is ascribed to God; but these are clinging survivals from an older time which are always a drag and a cloud upon a new revelation. But there can be no doubt that the preëminent revelation of the New Testament is of a pardoning God. But our obstinate inability to think well of the idea of unconditional

pardon still requires us to attribute to God characteristics which are at bottom quite irreconcilable with the central New Testament conviction.

For one thing, we ascribe to God a justice which is of a piece with our public justice. This public justice is conceived as lying in the equitable adjustment of conflicting claims, in the suitable redress of injury, in the due punishment of offences. Its whole intention appears to be the preservation of a threatened equilibrium or the repair of a disturbed equilibrium. One who has done an injury is subjected to a similar or an equivalent injury. What has been sung in jest is really a maxim of common justice—to "make the punishment fit the crime." We punish murder with death. If no longer we say "an eye for an eye," yet when a man loses an eye through the offence or the negligence of another, we assess a money equivalent and award it as "damages." If an ill-disposed person has cast some aspersions on our integrity, we ask the court to say that our hurt is only to be healed by the payment of a specific sum of money, The whole motive of our public justice is the idea of equilibration; and it is worth observing that the traditional symbol of Justice is a blindfolded woman holding in her hand a pair of scales. And if we carried our analysis further we should see that our common conception of justice arises from a doctrine of particular rights (whether of the individual or of the group) which are always self-regarding, and are therefore

potentially in conflict. Our whole apparatus of "law and order" is a device which we have invented to keep us from cutting each other's throats and putting our hands in each other's pockets.

Our justice, in respect of offences, is a justice of *retaliation*; and it is to be noticed that Jesus expressly repudiates it. He supersedes the *lex talionis* (which is commonly taken to justify, whereas it was meant to limit retaliation) with the simple counsel to avoid retaliation altogether; [8] and He goes on to advocate a quite different treatment of the offender. Instead of breaking the offender's head, which is our natural desire, He bids us set about doing a much more useful and fundamental thing, to break the offender's heart. The proper treatment of the offender is to turn him into a friend. This is another kind of *justice,* the justice of *reconciliation;* and this kind of justice springs from a conception of common human interests which are always and everywhere identical, and indicates that the true human righteousness consists of mutuality, reciprocity, co-operation—call it what you will.

Now, the justice of retaliation is better than anarchy. It is simply the organisation of our better selves against our worse selves. As Jesus implies, the impulse behind the law will, if you obey it fully, carry you beyond the law into a new type of human relationship. The justice of retaliation is a stage on the road from anarchy to the ampler justice of reconciliation. But if we are to

attribute justice to God at all, it is this ampler justice we must attribute; and the name of this justice is love. In God love and justice are one.

There are other considerations which are germane to this question. Our justice works by punishment or the threat of punishment; and in view of the manifest failure of punishment, after so long a time, to do away with crime or even materially to diminish its volume, we should hesitate a good deal before we ascribe a punitive justice to God. That there is a redemptive virtue in punishment is a hoary superstition, the demise of which is long overdue. For between punishment and redemption there is a great gulf fixed. Punishment is an estranging and embittering and hardening influence. So far from evoking penitence, it provokes resentment, and so drives the offender farther from redemption. Punishment makes a man sorry for himself, not for his sins. God cannot be conceived as doing anything so self-defeating as punishing men whom He wishes to reconcile to Himself. If men decline God's gift of reconciliation, then they invite the inevitable consequences of estrangement. They reap the harvest they have sown. But this is not formal retributive punishment in the way we inflict punishment.

Further, it is not conceivable that the divine justice should be coercive. For sin is a disease of man's freedom; and to cure the disease by destroying the freedom would be a device too costly and entirely self-defeating.

It would be to throw the baby away with the bath, to destroy the manhood with the disease. The problem of dealing with sin is how to cure the disease without sacrificing the freedom. Plainly there can be no elements of coercion in redemption.

This, one would think, should have been sufficiently obvious. Yet for centuries Christian theology has befuddled itself by ascribing to God both the justice of retaliation and the justice of reconciliation, which is love. It recognised that God forgave the sinner, but it could not conceive how God could forgive without a *quid pro quo*. Hence came that eternal argument between Justice and Mercy, of which the old Welsh preachers of my boyhood never tired; but which moved that sensitive and devout poet, T. E. Brown, to angry satire:

> *Now Justification.* . . .
> "By faith?" I fancy: Aye the old equation;
> Go it, Justice! Go it, Mercy!
> Go it, Douglas! Go it, Percy!
>
> * * * *
>
> Dry bones! Dry bones!

Hence came, too, those doctrines of satisfaction, propitiation, ransom, substitution and the like, which have no possible justification in fact. The air that God breathes is not that of a law court but that of a home; and quasi-legal transactions are no more pertinent to the relations of God to his creatures than they are to

the relations of father and child. It is surely time that these transactional theories of the Atonement should be put on the scrap-heap. God's relations to his creatures are in no sense contractual or formal; they are as organic and spontaneous as the relations within a wholesome family—unless, indeed, the divine love be something different from the finest love we meet in human life.

But if, then, we are to adopt the view that God's sole method of dealing with sinners is that of unconditional forgiveness, are we not then to conclude that God takes a lighter view of sin than the old theologians did? This is an old mistake, as old as the Psalmist and probably older.

When thou sawest a thief, thou consentedst with him,
And hast been partaker with adulterers.
Thou givest thy mouth to evil,
And thy tongue frameth deceit,
Thou sittest and speakest against thy brother,
Thou slanderest thine own mother's son.
These things thou didst and I kept silence.
Thou thoughtest that I was altogether such as one as thyself.'

They had waited for the rod to fall on them; but it had not fallen; and they gathered that there was no rod. That God's displeasure did not overtake them swiftly seemed to them to show that God was careless of sin. They failed to see that what they took for carelessness was the patience of the divine love.

But let us, before we go further, clear our minds

about sin in this connection. There is more than one standpoint from which it may be viewed. We have already had something to say about it as an offence against the processes of life. We may more formally conceive of it as a breach of the moral order; or we may think of it in a vague way as an offence against an abstract "righteousness." But we are now thinking of sin in relation to a living God, who is concerned for the process of life and the moral order, and is Himself the ultimate righteousness. At this point sin becomes something very concrete and immediate. It is the creature's breach with God. It is, as it were, an affair between persons; and in its most arrogant forms, the New Testament describes it as enmity towards God. "When," says the writer of the *Theologia Germanica,* "the creature claimeth for its own anything good, such as Substance, Knowledge, Life, Power and in short whatever we should call good, as if it were that or possessed that . . . as often as this cometh to pass, the creature goeth astray. What did the devil do else or what was his going astray but that he claimed for himself to be somewhat, and would have it that somewhat was his, and something that was due to him? This setting up of a claim, and his I and Me and Mine—these were his going astray and his fall. And so it is to this day." And there, stripped of theological mystery, is the final view of sin. It is the fact of man at odds with God.

Now if God were like an oriental despot, whose *amour propre* had been wounded by the contumacy of one of his subjects, or if He were a law-giver intent on maintaining the majesty of the law against evil-doers, He would show how seriously he regarded sin by visiting it with condign punishment. But the spectacle we contemplate is rather that of a father desiring to repair a broken bond and to recover a beloved but rebellious child. So seriously does he regard his child's wilful self-alienation from him that he will spare no cost to himself to conciliate the child and to win him back home. That is a picture far more true to the realities of the case than that of the offended potentate or the outraged law-giver. God's expedient for dealing with the case is forgiveness.

And this, as we have seen in a previous lecture, is, in respect of God's behaviour towards man, the primary significance of the Cross. Above the human hell that raged around the Cross, the voice of a conquering love was heard: *Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do.* Towards God, Jesus was man; towards man, He was God; and this is the word of God over against the worst deed of man. When sin had done its utmost, forgiveness held the field; and God spoke in a word of reconciliation. In a sense somewhat other than St. Paul meant, God on the Cross cleared his character, "declared his righteousness," which had been compromised "by the passing over of sins done aforetime."

God forbore to punish sinners, because his "righteousness" was *love*. His forbearance was incidental to His forgiveness. God's punishment is pardon. His retribution is reconciliation; His revenge is forgiveness.

3. Forgiveness

It is unthinkable to us that there should be forgiveness without repentance. Before we forgive, we require penitences, apologies, amends. But in that case forgiveness is an obligation. "If he repent, thou shalt forgive him." Where there is repentance, there is a *duty* of forgiveness. But it is necessary here to draw a distinction. There is a duty of forgiveness where there is repentance; but there is also a *grace* of forgiveness which anticipates the repentance and goes out to provoke it. This is the essential meaning of the "hard sayings" about the other cheek and the second mile. According to Jesus, the way with offenders is the way of forgiveness and magnanimity; and by forgiveness and magnanimity to induce a change of heart. So also St. Paul: "If thine enemy hunger, feed him, if he thirst, give him to drink, so shalt thou help coals of fire on his head" (or, as in Moffatt, "make him feel a burning sense of shame"), that is, thou shalt move him to repentance. And this is the view that in one place St. Paul holds of God's procedure: God commendeth His love towards us in this, that *while we were yet sinners,* Christ died for us. *While we were yet enemies,* we were reconciled to

God by the death of his Son. God has not waited for our repentance. He has gone out to provoke it.

But the idea of forgiveness is much more than the mere remission of sins. It is not oblivion, just "letting bygones be bygones." It includes "forgetting the things that are behind," but it does more than that. Indeed, forgiveness is concerned more with the future than with the past. In the parable of the two debtors, Jesus likens sin to a bad debt and the forgiveness of sin to the writing off of a bad debt, "And when they had nothing to pay, he frankly forgave them both." But quite evidently this is no more than the threshold of forgiveness. A business man writes off a bad debt because it is no use keeping it on his books. It is no longer an asset; it has even become a liability. It is a matter between him and himself, rather than between him and the debtor. He is simply dismissing the debtor out of his affairs. But forgiveness does more than that. It is still concerned with the debtor after the debt is written off; and indeed, it only writes off the debt in order to recommence business with the defaulter on the old terms. It is not merely discharging the bankrupt; it is setting him up in business again. It is not merely cutting the loss, mere oblivion of the debt. It is restoration; it is the re-establishment of a broken relationship. It is reconciliation.

But obviously the transaction is incomplete if the proffered forgiveness of God is not accepted. It takes two to make a quarrel; it takes the good will of two to

make it up again. God's offer of reconciliation is profitless, if the offender rejects it. God offers his forgiveness to move the sinner to a change of heart, so that the change of heart may effect a full reconciliation. God is at one with the sinner; but that avails nothing until the sinner ceases to be at odds with God. The Proclamation of Slave Emancipation made every slave free in the United States; but it was effective only for those who chose to assert their freedom. "God was in Christ reconciling the world unto Himself," but the reconciliation is effectual only when we enter into it.

This, as I understand it, is the theology of grace. Grace is the love of God acting redemptively. This word "grace" had a long history before it came to have a Christian use. It is an instance, the best instance, of a word being captured by the Gospel and elevated to a finer use than it had in its previous currency. Χάρις had originally a purely physical reference. It was the word used of the quality which goes with the perfect bodily form, comeliness of contour, ease and poise of carriage, the quality which we still describe as "graceful." Then it came to be used of the inner man, of mind and character; and that use of it remains in our word "gracious." Gracefulness gives pleasure to the eye, graciousness gives pleasure to mind and heart. The next step was the use of the word to describe not only the quality of the character but its *outgoing,* the influence that passed from it, the kind of radiance it shed. It is at this point

that the Gospel laid hold of it and lifted it to its supreme use. To us it stands for the outgoing of the nature and the character of God, the divine essence in action towards man. It is the love of God at work in and upon His children, the very radiance (or, if you will, radiation) of the eternal Father.

But it is implied in our idea of grace that this outgoing of the divine character is unconstrained. It is spontaneous, free and unconditioned. It is not to be bought at a price; it is not to be won by merit. It cannot be deserved or requited. God's own love is His sole constraint. Besides, the word implies as in an undertone a suggestion of unqualified regal generosity. I suppose this has come from some old surviving associations of the kingly image of God, as of the great King who shows a magnanimity commensurate with his station. What God gives is with a generosity which is commensurate with His greatness.

So He forgives before we repent; He answers before we call; He reconciles us to Himself while we are yet enemies. And all this in order to evoke in us a corresponding motion. First of all the godly sorrow which worketh repentance; or as our fathers put it, conviction of sin leading to a "change of heart." If any man supposes that the remedy is a gentle one, he has yet to undergo it. Did God wield a rod, man might stand up to it; it is His forgiveness that breaks our pride and humbles us to the dust. But it is this same forgiveness

that lifts us up again. For upon repentance comes, as by a natural succession, faith, which here is the act of will by which we accept our forgiveness, by which we acknowledge and surrender ourselves to the divine love. And out of it comes what Dr. Oman has called "a gracious personal relationship" between God and man, a relation free and unconstrained, friendly and harmonious, expressing itself in intimacy of communion and partnership. This is the Atonement.

4. The Outcome of Forgiveness

I said a few pages back that forgiveness was concerned less with the past than with the future. Correspondingly we find that the positive outcome of forgiveness in the individual is a new beginning. It is a release from the past; negatively, it is a cleaning of the slate as between man and God. But it is to be recognised as something more radical than turning over a new leaf; it is rather more like beginning a new book. What is involved in the first critical and decisive experience of forgiveness is the consciousness of a new start in life.

This is implicit in all the rich New Testament terminology which has to do with this experience. The terms are for the most part pictorial. Redemption is a picture of a slave being brought into freedom; justification, of a man leaving the bar with a free pardon and with the status of a free man; adoption, of a waif being

received into a family; and so forth. In every case it is a picture of a man being presented with a fresh start in life. But there is a distinction to be made among these terms. For while some of them signify the attainment of a new status before God (as e.g. justification, adoption), others refer to some kind of organic change in the soul, as, for example, the new man, the new creation. There can be no doubt, I think, that in St. Paul's mind this particular crisis, which establishes a new relation to God, is also a transition in the individual from flesh to spirit, from natural to supernatural. Possibly we should identify here an "emergence" in the Lloyd Morgan sense. St. Paul, himself, is a case in point. His experience of "justification" seems to have been peculiarly vivid, judging by the assurance with which he speaks of it. The term comes as we have seen from the law courts, and by reason of St. Paul's inherited background of legalism it was a good deal more than a metaphor in his use of it. But its essential significance lay in that he had been declared to be, and therefore was, in the old phrase, "right with God." The legal flavour of the term is incidental; what is essential is the experience of harmony with God. But quite clearly this experience also changed Saul into Paul. This child of a stereotyped religion and of a standardised morality, himself the fine flower of the Rabbinical system, becomes the advocate of a new faith. This zealous upholder of a vigorous legalism starts out to

blaze new trails for the good life. It is easy to see how appropriate to this revolution in his life were such images as resurrection (Eph. ii. 1), recreation, the new man. The attainment of harmony with God through forgiveness would therefore appear to be completed in the transformation of the individual into a new being, having a new and hitherto unpossessed quality of life. The new relation to God does not so much make us better men as *different* men. Its effect is not reformation but transformation. As in Cana, the water of life is turned to wine.

In this connection it may be added that the term "adoption" probably refers not only to a new relation to God, but to admission into a family; and the image of naturalisation (in Eph. ii. 19) points to a similar condition. It belongs to the "new beginning" that a man is integrated into a society. There is not only a new man but a new society. With this subject I have dwelt at length elsewhere; and here I will only point out that the new beginning that forgiveness enables man to make involves him in a threefold change of relationship—to God, to himself and to human society. It embraces the whole of his life. All things, as St. Paul said, are become new.

We have come, if not to the end of the subject, to the end of our space. But you will suffer me to add a few concluding words.

The love of God is most manifestly revealed in his redemptive activity; but that does not mean that redemption is the chief concern of God. Redemption is one aspect of the divine activity of creation, which at this present stage is the creation of a new humanity. Redemption has been called for by the hindrances, the obstructions, the drags which man in his waywardness has set in the way of the divine intention. None the less, it remains true that God's love is most vividly apprehended in the work of redemption. But that is precisely for the same reason as that, in human relations, love shows itself most conspicuously in healing, in forgiveness, in its self-sacrifice for the incapable and the unworthy. In the rest of life love goes on working; but there we take it for granted. It goes about its business and calls no attention to itself. The prodigal son never knew how much his father loved him until he was welcomed home from his profligacy; but the love had always been there, sustaining the life and guarding the welfare of the family.

Yet the chief concern of God is with creation. Even if man had not gone astray, God would still be engaged in the business of bringing forth a new humanity, in raising man from the plane of nature to the plane of spirit. Even if man had not sinned, the Word would have become flesh, as a necessary episode in the creation of a new humanity. The Incarnation would have been required, in order to reinforce, to direct and to focus

the aspiration of man. Redemption and the specific revelation of unconditional forgiveness were called for by the interruption of the creative process through the appearance of sin. The stream of life had taken a wrong direction, and it had to be brought back to its own original course before the divine intention could take *its* course. The forgiveness of sins is the repair of a broken harmony, the restoration of a *status quo ante.* But that is not an end in itself. Forgiveness is the necessary condition of the resumption of the creative process. It is the moral readjustment which precedes the new birth.

But it is worth observing that, both in revelation and redemption, God proceeds in the same fashion. He reveals Himself in order to provoke our prayer; He forgives in order to provoke our repentance. The initiative is with God. From which the inference clearly is that God wills to draw men to Himself, that He does not wait to be sought by us but Himself comes forth to seek us. At least, it is plain that it is He who stirs us to our search of Him. Whether it be an innocent soul that cries out its desire to the heavens or a profligate youth who rises from the swine trough, having by some miracle received news from home, it is God who has moved both the one and the other.

And this is the God with whom we have to do. He is the Father to Whom Jesus taught us to pray, Whose face is the face of Jesus. He is at once the God of

nature and the God of grace; and His evident signature is on all His work. We have throughout our argument assumed the truth of evolution and have accepted it as a mode of the divine activity. But we have declined to accept it as the only mode. For we have traced Him in the life of man as a God of revelation and a God of redemption; and from his ways with man, we have concluded that His character is Love. We have not discovered any reason in the knowledge of our time why we may not conceive of Him in this fashion; we have, indeed, rather found aid and comfort in thus conceiving Him from some of the conspicuous teachers of this age. But this is not to say that we have comprehended God all in all. We have, indeed, been compelled to admit that there are questions which for the present must go unanswered; and we have learned only so much as our slow and limited human faculty can lay hold of. Thoughts that lie beyond our present compass must be thought, and language as yet to be found in no vocabulary must be fashioned, if ever we are to know and to tell the mystery of God. But we have, I trust, learned enough to go on with; and the only possible test of the truth that we have learned is to live by it.

NOTES

I

[1] Peake and Fleure, *Hunters and Artists*, p. 92.

[2] See Chapter II. The English translation is called *"The Graces of Interior Prayer,"* Kegan, Paul.

[3] I have used the term "unknown" so far, because I want at this stage to avoid raising the questions which would inevitably be started if I spoke of God. My immediate purpose is to analyse the phenomenon of prayer without introducing at this point any presuppositions as to the nature and character of the object to which prayer is directed.

[4] J. A. Thomson, *The System of Animate Nature*, p. 490.

[5] See for this Dr. Oman's essay on "The Sphere of Religion" in *Science, Religion and Reality*, Macmillan, 1925.

II

[1] F. C. Burkitt, *The Gospel History and its Transmission*, p. 20.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 79ff. Ever since I read Professor Burkitt's treatment of this incident twenty years ago, I have been increasingly convinced of the truth of his reading of its significance. In the account of the second stage of Jesus's public ministry also, I largely follow Professor Burkitt.

III

[1] This paragraph so far epitomises a detailed study of the ground which may be found in my book, *The Jesus of Poets and Prophets* (S. C. M.).

[2] Rudolph Eucken, *Christianity and the New Idealism*, p. 51.

[3] *"H. W. M.,"* edited by H. G. Massingham, p. 274.

[4] S. Alexander, *Space, Time and Deity*, Vol. II, pp. 345, 347, etc.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 347.

[6] *Evolution in the Light of Modern Knowledge*, essay on "Biology," p. 114.

[7] Lloyd Morgan, *Emergent Evolution*, p. 31.

[8] Lloyd Morgan, *Life, Mind and Spirit*, p. 313.

[9] Lloyd Morgan, *Emergent Evolution*, p. 34.

[10] Whitehead, *Science in the Modern World*, p. 250.
[11] *Ibid.*, p. 229.
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 151.

IV

[1] H. G. Wells, *The Open Conspiracy*, p. 21.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 22.
[3] *Adventure*, ed. B. H. Streeter, p. 192, essay on "Objectivity in Religion."
[4] Eddington, *Space, Time and Gravitation*, p. 200.
[5] *The Mind*, edited by R. J. S. McDowell, essay on "Psychology."

V

[1] J. A. Thomson, *System of Animate Nature*, p. 600.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 556.
[3] Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, p. 119.
[4] J. A. Thomson, *System of Animate Nature*, p. 376.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 376.
[6] W. J. Perry, *The Growth of Civilisation*, p. 196.
[7] W. H. R. Rivers, *Social Organisation*, p. 169.
[8] Peake and Fleure, *Hunters and Artists*, p. 144.
[9] This notable passage I cut out of Mr. Chesterton's paper, but the cutting is without a date. I think it appeared about two years ago.
[10] A. N. Whitehead, *Religion in the Making*, p. 96.
[11] *Ibid.*, p. 98.
[12] Vernon Kellogg, *Human Life as the Biologist Sees It*, p. 135.
[13] R. Ellis Roberts, *Life as Material* (Benn's Sixpenny Series).
[14] J. Y. Simpson, *Man and the Attainment of Immortality*, p. 272.
[15] J. W. N. Sullivan, *Aspects of Science*, p. 103.

VI

[1] R. W. Emerson, *Society and Solitude* (Everyman's Library), p. 192.
[2] J. A. Thomson, *System of Animate Nature*, p. 631.
[3] I think that the translation "resist not evil" probably misrepresents Jesus. The logic of the passage requires rather "retaliate not upon evil." I am aware that there is no instance where the verb ἀνθίστημι means "to retaliate"; but it might conceivably have that meaning, as it is a word of some elasticity. In a discussion of Justice, it is not impertinent to observe that the derivative ἀντισταθμή means a balance; and the corresponding adjective, ἀντίσταθμος, is given by Liddell and Scott as meaning "equivalent to."
[4] Psalm l. 18-21.

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